Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Decades of Maturation by Tetunic, Fran L.
Nova Law Review
Volume 28, Issue 1 2003 Article 5




Copyright c©2003 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
FLORIDA MEDIATION CASE LAW:
TWO DECADES OF MATURATION
FRAN L. TETUNIC*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................................................ 88
II. C ONFIDENTIALITY ............................................................................ 91
A. Protection of Confidentiality ..................................................... 91
B. Enforcement of Confidentiality ................................................ 97
C. Rules of Procedure Impact Confidentiality ................................. 101
D. Waiver of Privilege of Confidentiality ........................................ 103
III. APPEARANCE AT M EDIATION ........................................................ 105
A. Obligation to Attend M ediation .................................................. 105
B. Authority to Settle at M ediation .................................................. 109
IV. COURTS SEEK TO UPHOLD MEDIATION AGREEMENTS .................. 111
A . M ediation Environment ............................................................... 111
B. Intent to be Bound by the Mediation Agreement ......................... 112
C. Finality of Mediation Agreements ............................................... 113
D. Enforcement of Mediation Agreements ....................................... 116
E. Interpretation of Mediation Agreements ..................................... 119
F. Parties Decide Mediation Agreement Coverage and Terms ....... 123
V. COURTS OVERTURN MEDIATION AGREEMENTS AS REQUIRED
B Y L A W .......................................................................................... 124
A . M ediator M isconduct .................................................................. 124
B. Extortion, Fraud, and Misrepresentation ................................... 125
C. Mediation Agreements May Not Violate the Law ....................... 126
D. Mutual Mistake and Lack of Consideration ................................ 128
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Clinic, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. Chair, Mediator Ethics
Advisory Committee, Florida Supreme Court. B.A. Hunter College, J.D. Nova Southeastern
University Law Center. The author wishes to thank Bruce Blitman, Professor Ronald Brown,
Professor Phyllis Coleman, Anuska Disisto, James Edwards, Monica Elliott, Judith Goodman,
Bobbi Hardwick, Professor Jani Maurer, Gilbert Moore, Sharon Press, Dean Gail Levin Rich-
mond, Professor Michael Richmond, and Charles Tetunic for their kind attention to the manu-
script. The author also wishes to thank Orlando Amador, Michelle Campbell, Bruce Dier,
Olympia Duhart, Ellen Fine, Stephanie Jean, Evan Kaine, Shelly Marks, and Denise Roland
for their research and assistance with the footnotes to this article.
The author dedicates this article to the memory of Professor Lawrence Kalevitch, late
of the faculty of the Shepard Broad Law Center. Larry was a keen observer and zealous ad-
vocate, yet a true mediator in heart and spirit.
1
Tetunic: Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Decades of Maturation
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LAW REVIEW
VI. PROCEDURAL AND RELATED MATTERS ......................................... 132
A . A ccess to the Courts .................................................................... 132
B. Use qf and Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution ................. 135
C. Obligations of Judges, Attorneys, and Paralegals ...................... 137
V II. C O NCLU SION .................................................................................. 142
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Charles Dickens wrote that being involved in a suit in England's Court
of Chancery was like: "being ground to bits in a slow mill; it's being roasted
at a slow fire; it's being stung to death by single bees; it's being drowned by
drops; it's going mad by grains."' One hundred and fifty years later, lawsuits
still evoke similar feelings in litigants. However, as one association of attor-
neys has pointed out, Dickens' warning still fails to keep them away from the
courts:
Hundreds and hundreds of people are exposed to such torture each
year, some of them actually choosing to initiate the process. They
invariably find the experience painful, protracted, and expensive.
Yet there remains a queue of victims impatient for their turn .... 2
Yet an ever-increasing throng has discovered the pursuit of justice need
not involve protracted pain. Presently in Florida, parties and attorneys rou-
tinely mediate their legal disputes, highlighting Florida's national recognition
as a leader in the field of mediation.3
"Mediation" means a process whereby a neutral third person called
a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dis-
pute between two or more parties. It is an informal and non-
adversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing par-
ties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement. In me-
diation, decision making authority rests with the parties. The role
of the mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties
I. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 53 (Oxford University Press 1987) (1853). Earlier
in the novel, Dickens suggests that the following motto hang over the doors of the Court of
Chancery: "'Suffer any wrong that can be done you, rather than come here! "' Id. at 3.
2. Collaborative Law Alliance of New Hampshire, available at
http://www.collaborativelawnh.org (wrongly attributed the quotation to Dickens' Bleak
House) (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
3. Bruce A. Blitman, Mediation in Florida: The Newly Emerging Case Law, FLA. B. J.,
Oct. 1996, at 44.
[Vol. 28:1:87
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in identifying issues, fostering joint problemsolving, and exploring
settlement alternatives.
4
With over two decades of court-connected mediation, Florida courts
have developed an extensive body of case law.5 This article seeks to memo-
rialize mediation's coming of age by collecting, discussing, and analyzing
the significant cases that comprise Florida's mediation common law, divid-
ing cases into five subject areas: confidentiality, appearance at mediation,
mediation agreements upheld by courts, mediation agreements overturned by
courts, and procedural and related matters. To avoid duplication, with few
exceptions, cases appear in only one subject area, although many appropri-
ately fit within two or more. Discussion of the over fifty Florida statutes that
mention mediation, as well as the applicable rules of procedure, lies beyond
the scope of this article. They will, of course, be noted when necessary to
understand or distinguish a case or concept, as will specific Florida Rules for
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators.
Mediation is a household word. One need only read the newspaper, lis-
ten to the news on radio or television, or surf the net to learn that distin-
guished statesmen are mediating in the Middle East, owners and players of
professional sports teams are mediating to divert a strike, or union members
and employers are mediating a new employment contract. If individuals
have not been directly involved with mediation, they probably know some-
one who has. The breadth of mediated matters ranges from a peer mediation
at school to mediation of a murder case following mistrial.6
Mediation is not new. "Use of mediation, similar to that which we see
today, can be traced back several hundreds, even thousands of years."7
4. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2002).
5. Florida's experience typifies that of the rest of the country. "In this new era, media-
tion is becoming more institutionalized, regularized and uniform. Or, expressed in different
terms, mediation is now reflecting the interests and values of the legal order. During the past
two decades we have witnessed an explosion of interest in mediation among judges and law-
yers." James J. Alfini, Mediation's Coming of(Legal) Age, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 153
(2002).
6. Despite the doubts of some commentators, Escambia County Judge Frank Bell sent
the case of Derek and Alex King, two brothers convicted of killing their father, to mediation.
Following trial, the judge threw out the murder convictions, and sent the case to mediation for
determination of appropriate sentences. The matter was fully resolved in mediation. State v.
King, Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 2001 CF 005612 available at
http://205.152.130.14/cvweb_lb.asp?ucase id.=31993884; ABA Journal eReport, Friday,
Oct. 25, 2002.
7. KIMBERLEE A. KOVACH, MEDIATION PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 25 n. 16 (2d ed. 2000).
"Use of mediation has been documented in ancient China over two thousand years ago. See,
2003]
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"Florida entered the ADR [Alternative Dispute Resolution] movement in the
mid-1970s with the establishment of 'citizen dispute settlement' (CDS) cen-
ters and pilot divorce mediation programs ....
In 1987, after Florida had experienced its great success with the
early CDS and divorce mediation programs, the Florida Legisla-
ture adopted one of the nation's most comprehensive court-
connected (read: [I]nstitutionalized) mediation and arbitration
statutes. Trial judges were given the broad discretion to order any
civil case to mediation or arbitration subject to Florida Supreme
Court rule.9
In 2001, over 100,000 cases were referred to court-connected mediation
programs.' ° Numerous other cases were privately mediated by the parties
before, during, or subsequent to suit. For many cases, mediation obviated
the need for court intervention. At the present time, all twenty judicial cir-
cuits refer a portion of their caseload to mediation." In addition, state appel-
late as well as federal cases are being mediated.
Over 5000 individuals have been certified as mediators by the Supreme
Court of Florida, and approximately 14,000 have completed Supreme Court
of Florida certified mediation training programs.' 2 Displaying commitment
to excellence in Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida has created three standing ADR committees: the Supreme Court Com-
mittee on ADR Rules, the Supreme Court Committee on ADR Policy, and
the Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee. It has also created two grievance
boards: the Mediation Training Review Board and the Mediator Qualifica-
tions Board. Additionally, Florida's Dispute Resolution Center offers an
ADR Innovative Grant Program allowing courts to apply for seed money to
create innovative dispute resolution projects. 3 To foster confidence in the
mediation process, and encourage mediators to keep abreast of ethical re-
sponsibilities and new developments in the law, Florida requires certified
mediators to comply with the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
for example, Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 55 CAL. L.
REV. 1201, 1205 (1996)."
8. Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 903, 905 (1997).
9. Id. at 907.
10. FLORIDA MEDIATION ARBITRATION PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM viii (Kimberly Ann
Kosch & Sharon Press eds., 15th ed. 2002).
11. Id.
12. Id. at ix.
13. Id. at vii.
(Vol. 28: 1:87
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Appointed Mediators and to complete sixteen hours of continuing mediator
education every two years.
Mediation has a long rich history, setting it apart from other ADR proc-
esses. Unique in its peacekeeping mission, mediation employs a neutral third
party who does not render a decision for the parties. 4 Rather, it stresses self-
determination of the parties, respecting their ability to make decisions. 5
"Mediation is not presented here as a panacea for the existing ills of our judi-
cial institutions, but rather as a dynamic process that must be understood
before being applied and one that can be particularly helpful in a number of
different kinds of disputes, including family conflicts and divorces."' 6 The
body of case law discussed in this article reflects the extent to which media-
tion has become an accepted and expected part of our legal system.
11. CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Protection of Confidentiality
"One of the fundamental axioms of mediation is the importance of con-
fidentiality. It is deemed necessary to foster the neutrality of the mediator
and essential if parties are to participate fully in the process."' 7 Confidential-
ity is the foundation on which mediation rests, allowing parties to build trust,
share information, problem solve, and decide whether to reach resolution.
"The assurance of confidentiality is essential to the integrity and success of
the Court's mediation program, in that confidentiality encourages candor
between the parties and on the part of the mediator, and confidentiality
serves to protect the mediation program from being used as a discovery tool
for creative attorneys."' 8 "Mediation could not take place if litigants had to
worry about admissions against interest being offered into evidence at trial, if
a settlement was not reached." 9
14. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.210.
15. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.230. Mediation emphasizes self-
determination, the needs and interests of the parties, fairness, procedural flexibility, confiden-
tiality, and full disclosure. Id.
16. Esdale v. Esdale, 487 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Marga-
ret S. Herrman, Book Review, 19 FAM. L.Q. 465 (1986) (reviewing Jay Folberg & Alison
Taylor, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT
LITIGATION (1984), 19 FAM. L.Q. 465 (1986)).
17. Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides
With Confidentiality, 35 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 35 (2001).
18. In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 636 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Lake Utopia Paper Ltd.
v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979)).
19. D.R. Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach, 819 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
2003]
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Mediation confidentiality may be bolstered by statutory privileges, rules
of evidence, rules of procedure, ethical rules, and contract law. "Although
mediators usually tell the parties that the proceedings are confidential, the
mediators [sic] promise does not create an evidentiary privilege or other pro-
tection that will be judicially recognized. ''20 In Florida, mediation confiden-
tiality is granted by statutory privilege. 2' The privilege is held by the parties,
but may be asserted by the mediator on their behalf. "Each party in a court-
ordered mediation proceeding has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent any person present at the proceeding from disclosing communica-
tions made during such proceeding. 22  Similarly, statutory privileges also
protect family, 23 mobile home, 24 and citizen dispute settlement center media-
tion communications.25
20. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of
Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91, 92 (1999).
21. In State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court
found no authority for the mediator's statement that the parties' communications during me-
diation were confidential and identified the legislature as the "proper branch of government
from which to obtain the necessary protection." Id. at 482. "[P]rivileges in Florida are no
longer creatures of judicial decision." Id. at 481 (citing Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)). Subsequently, in 1987 the legislature enacted a confidentiality
privilege for court ordered mediation. Ch. 172, 1987 Fla. Laws (enacting FLA. STAT. §
44.302(2) (1987)). In 1990 Ch. 188, 1990 Fla. Laws amended and renumbered this statute as
FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3). Prior to creating a privilege for court-ordered mediation, the legisla-
ture enacted a confidentiality privilege for family mediation (Ch. 96, 1982 Fla. Laws creating
FLA. STAT. § 61.21(3), renumbered § 749.01(3) (1982)), a confidentiality privilege for Citizen
Dispute Settlement Center mediation (Ch. 228, 1985 Fla. Laws creating FLA. STAT.
§ 44.201(5) (1985)), and a confidentiality privilege for mobile home mediation (Ch. 198, 1990
Fla. Laws adding FLA. STAT. § 723.038(9) (1990)). The confidentiality privilege for family
mediation was renumbered § 44.101(3) in 1985. Since 1986 the confidentiality privilege for
family mediation has been codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.183(3). (Ch. 220, 1986 Fla. Laws).
22. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002). This statutory section further provides that "all oral
or written communications in mediation proceedings, other than the executed settlement
agreement, are exempt from the requirements of [Florida Statutes] chapter 119, and shall be
confidential and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding, unless all par-
ties agree otherwise." Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 61.183(3) (2002).
Each party to a mediation proceeding has a privilege during and after the proceeding to refuse
to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing communications made during the proceed-
ing, whether or not the contested issues are successfully resolved. This subsection shall not be
construed to prevent or inhibit the discovery or admissibility of any information that is other-
wise subject to discovery or that is admissible under applicable law or rules of court, except
that any conduct or statements made during a mediation proceeding or in negotiations concern-
ing the proceeding are inadmissible in any judicial proceeding.
Id.
24. FLA. STAT. § 723.038(8) (2002). "Each party involved in the mediation proceeding
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any person present at the proceeding from
[Vol. 28:1:87
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Mediators governed by Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators have a duty to protect the confidentiality of the media-
tion process.26 "A mediator shall maintain confidentiality of all information
revealed during mediation except where disclosure is required by law."27
During the orientation session, the mediator must inform the mediation par-
ticipants that "communications made during the process are confidential,
except where disclosure is required by law."2 Additionally, "[i]nformation
obtained during caucus may not be revealed by the mediator to any other
mediation participant without the consent of the disclosing party. 2 9 Media-
tors must also maintain confidentiality regarding mediation records, and
while participating in training and research activities may not disclose identi-
fying information.3°
Attorneys and parties may mistakenly assume that all mediation com-
munications are confidential. However, only some mediators are required to
comply with the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Media-
disclosing, communications made during such proceeding, whether or not the dispute was
successfully resolved." Id. This statutory section further provides:
[T]here is no privilege as to communications made in furtherance of the commission of a crime
or fraud or as part of a plan to commit a crime or a fraud. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed so as to permit an individual to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal con-
duct.
Id. The last sentence is the original language from the privilege for court-ordered mediation
enacted in 1987. Ch. 172, 1987 Fla. Laws. In 1990 this language was deleted from the privi-
lege for court-ordered mediaion. Ch. 1988, 1990 Fla. Laws.
25. FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (2002).
Any information relating to a dispute obtained by any person while performing any duties for
the center from the files, reports, case summaries, mediator's notes, or other communications
or materials, oral or written, is confidential and exempt from the provisions of section
119.07(I) and shall not be publicly disclosed without the written consent of all parties to the
dispute. Any research or evaluation effort directed at assessing program activities or perform-
ance shall protect the confidentiality of such information. Each party to a Citizen Dispute Set-
tlement Center proceeding has a privilege during and after those proceedings to refuse to dis-
close and to prevent another from disclosing communications made during such proceedings,
whether or not the dispute was successfully resolved.
Id.
26. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360. The ethical rules provide standards
of conduct for certified and court-appointed mediators. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD.
MEDIATORS 10.200. For other mediators, the rules are merely advisory. Accordingly, only
mediators governed by the ethical rules are subject to disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the
rules. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.700.
27. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
28. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.420(a)(3).
29. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(b). Caucus refers to private meet-
ings between the mediator and one or some of the mediation participants. Id.
30. FLA. R. CERT. &CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(c).
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31 32tors," and only some mediated matters are covered by statutory privileges.
Additionally, Florida's evidentiary exclusion is more limited than the media-
tion statutory privileges, as it only limits admissibility of settlement negotia-
tions at trial.33 Consequently, in an attempt to safeguard the confidentiality
of mediation communications, attorneys, mediators, and parties are entering
into carefully crafted confidentiality agreements prior to mediation to pro-
vide contractual protection and clarity.34
Florida Statutes provide inconsistent direction regarding a mediator's
role in protecting the confidentiality of the mediation process. The statutory
privilege for court-ordered mediation provides that each party to a mediation
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent anyone present at the media-
tion session from disclosing communications made during the mediation
proceeding.35 Yet, Florida statutory law requires mandatory reporting of
child abuse and neglect, as well as abuse and neglect of the elderly and indi-
viduals with disabilities.36 These matters, the statutes direct, must be re-
31. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-AP'PTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a). Only certified mediators and
court-appointed mediators are obligated to comply with these rules.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3), § 61.183(3), § 723. 038(8), § 44.201(5) (2002).
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2002). See Ehrhardt, supra note 20, at 102, for analysis of the
protection provided to mediation proceedings by rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
34. "[I]t is up to the parties during non-court-ordered mediation to provide by agreement
confidentiality of the mediation. Absent that agreement there currently is no statute, constitu-
tional provision/interpretation, or rule that extends confidentiality to non-court-ordered media-
tion." State v. Trull, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. D289, D290 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2002). Statutory
confidentiality privileges do apply to court-ordered, family, mobile home, and citizen dispute
settlement center mediations. See supra notes 22-25.
35. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002). The first Florida statute granting a privilege for
court-ordered mediation provided in relevant part:
There is no privilege as to communications made in furtherance of the commission of a crime
or fraud or as part of a plan to commit a crime or a fraud. Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed so as to permit an individual to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal con-
duct.
FLA. STAT. § 44.302(2) (1987). This language was deleted in 1990. Ch. 188, 1990 Fla. Laws
(amending FLA. STAT. § 44.302(2) (1987)). In 1992, a proposed amendment providing for
exceptions to the mediation privilege was not adopted. It read:
There shall be no privilege and no restriction on disclosure in relation to communications
which give the mediator knowledge of, or reasonable cause to suspect, that a child has been
abused or neglected. There is no privilege and no restriction on disclosure as to communica-
tions made in furtherance of the commission of a crime or fraud or as part of a plan to commit
a crime or fraud. Nothing in subsection (3) shall be construed so as to permit an individual to
obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal conduct.
H.B. 183 (1992).
36. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 415.1034 (2002). Additionally, Florida
law prohibits the concealment of public hazards. The applicable statute does not require man-
datory reporting, but does provide:
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public
hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful
[Vol. 28:1:87
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ported by anyone who knows or has reasonable cause to suspect the prohib-
ited conduct.37 What then is the mediator's obligation if she learns of child
abuse during the mediation? Many court certified mediators construe the
statutes in conjunction with their ethical obligation to keep everything confi-
dential except where disclosure is required by law, 38 and read the statutes as
requiring confidentiality with the exception of their legal obligation to report
abuse and neglect. 39 However, not all who mediate in Florida are bound by
Florida's ethical rules for mediators, and some mediators may not believe
they are required by law to report abuse and neglect.
Canons of statutory construction, presumptions that vary in strength ac-
cording to the importance of the policy behind them,40 are helpful in constru-
ing these apparently conflicting statutes. However, as many disagree on
when these canons apply as well as their relative weight, they will not pro-
vide a definitive answer to our question. They will, regardless, assist in for-
mulating plausible ways to construe the statutes and offer a basis for rea-
soned interpretation. Speaking off the record, one mediator acknowledges
that one judge in the state believes the later statute (mediation privilege) con-
trols the earlier statutes (reporting abuse and neglect), and the statute specific
to mediators controls the general mandatory reporting statutes. While a
canon does provide that a newer statute controls because it has the effect of
repealing the earlier one, it only has that effect to the extent of the inconsis-
tency.4 This canon applies when it is impossible to interpret two statutes
harmoniously. If one reads the mediation confidentiality statute as requiring
that everything except the written agreement is confidential, one might
choose to employ this canon to reach the conclusion that mediators need not
report abuse and neglect. If however, one believes the statutes may be inter-
preted harmoniously (the mediators keep confidentiality with the limited
exceptions required by the other statutes), the canon is not appropriately ap-
plied.
Another canon provides that the specific provision controls the general
one. 42 Many mediators employ this canon to determine that they have an
to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the pub-
lic hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.
FLA. STAT. § 69.081(4) (2002).
37. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 415.1034 (2002).
38. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
39. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002); FLA. STAT. § 415.1034 (2002).
40. See generally, RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT (NITA 2002).
41. Id. at 96 (citing Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1234
(Fla. 2000)).
42. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 40, at 90.
2003]
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obligation to report abuse and neglect which the legislature specifically ear-
marked for mandatory reporting. This interpretation is consistent with the
mediator's ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality except where re-
quired by law, and the approach to read in pari materia new statutes that
concern the same subject matter.43 "In pari materia, 'part of the same mate-
rial,' provides that new legislation be interpreted to make it consistent with
existing statutes that concern the same subject matter."'  Mediators gener-
ally prefer interpreting the statutes as coexisting harmoniously, requiring
them to honor confidentiality, yet report child and vulnerable adult abuse and
neglect.
Nonetheless, neither statutory construction nor case law adequately ad-
vises a mediator as to the breadth of and possible exceptions to mediation
confidentiality privileges. One case does highlight the tension between the
public policy to communicate child abuse and the public policy to honor
confidentiality. 45 In C.R. v. E., the parties agreed to resolve their differences
through the mediation/arbitration forum offered by the Christian Conciliation
Service of Central Florida, Inc. ("CCS"). 46 The matter to be resolved was the
parents' allegation that a Catholic priest had fondled their minor daughter. 7
CCS rules included one entitled "Confidentiality" which read: "All state-
ments made during the conciliation process will be of a confidential nature
and will not be made known to persons not involved in the process."'4' The
CCS arbitrators reached a decision, finding that "the priest had touched the
daughter in an inappropriate manner on several occasions and that the
Church was negligent in retaining and supervising him. '49 The arbitration
panel found against the priest and the Church jointly and severally in the
amount of $250,000.50 Subsequent to payment of the full amount by the lo-
cal Diocese to the parents, counsel for the parents informed church counsel
that they considered any confidentiality agreement null and void.5 The court
of appeal disagreed, affirming per curiam the trial court's refusal to dissolve
a temporary injunction enjoining the parents from communicating with third
parties regarding the proceeding.5 2 The strong well-reasoned dissent main-
tained the requirement of confidentiality was void as a matter of public pol-
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id.
45. See C.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
46. Id. (Cobb, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1089.
50. C.R., 573 So. 2d at 1089 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1088.
[Vol. 28:1:87
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icy, 53 and moreover, a person who takes money on an agreement to conceal a
felony is guilty of a third degree felony.54
Florida mediators, attorneys, and parties need clear guidance as to what
is not confidential during mediation. The statutory confidentiality privileges
apply to only some of the many mediated cases. The mediation privilege for
court-ordered cases leaves doubt as to the mediator's obligation to report
matters that may be deemed "required by law," and does not clarify what, if
anything, is required by law. Additionally, mediators who are not certified
or court-appointed do not have the ethical obligation to keep mediation
communications confidential unless required by law. Given the many vari-
ables, confidentiality will vary greatly based on whether a privilege applies,
the court ordered mediation, the mediator is certified, and the parties entered
into a confidentiality agreement. The legislature would do well to clarify the
confidentiality privilege with careful attention to the experiences and con-
cerns of the mediators, attorneys, judges, and parties. In State v. Trull, a
circuit court respectfully suggested "the Legislature review the wisdom of
extending confidentiality to non court-ordered mediation conducted by certi-
fied mediators who are subject to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators.9
55
B. Enforcement of Confidentiality
Florida judges have recognized the importance of confidentiality to me-
diation and have enforced mediation confidentiality agreements and privi-
leges. Judges may also severely sanction mediation participants who do not
abide by confidentiality agreements. In Paranzino v. Barnett Bank, the trial
court dismissed plaintiffs case with prejudice finding that plaintiff and her
attorney deliberately and willfully breached the confidentiality provision in
their Mediation Report and Agreement.56 After attending court-ordered me-
53. Id The public policy cited by dissent provides "any person ... who knows, or has
reasonable cause to suspect, that a child is .. .abused . . . shall report such knowledge or
suspicion to the (Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services) ...." CR., 573 So. 2d at
1089 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1989)).
54. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 843.14(4) (1989)).
55. 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. D289 (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2002).
56. 690 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The parties and their counsel,
signers of the report and agreement, agreed to be bound by confidentiality agreements and not
to disclose any discussions unless agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the court.
Id. Further, they agreed that the mediation was covered by the provisions of Chapter 44 of the
Florida Statutes and rule 1.700 et seq. of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 728.
Section 44.102(3) of the Florida Statutes provided that communications in a court-ordered
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diation at which the parties did not settle, Victoria Paranzino and her attorney
disclosed to a Miami Herald reporter the settlement offer made by Barnett
Bank during their mediation conference.57 The resulting article which ap-
peared in the Miami Herald's Tropic Magazine recounted Paranzino's ver-
sion of the facts of her case and statements, attributed to her attorney, dis-
cussing the settlement offer.58 The appellate court affirmed the imposition of
the harshest sanction of dismissing the case with prejudice, finding that ap-
pellant Paranzino and her attorney deliberately violated the court order set-
ting the matter for mediation, breached the confidentiality provision in the
Mediation Report and Agreement, and disregarded the governing statute and
rule of procedure by disclosing the settlement offer to the Miami Herald. 59
The trial court based its ruling on strong public policy honoring mediation
confidentiality.6" "If the trial court were to allow this willful and deliberate
conduct to go unchecked, continued behavior in this vein could have a chill-
ing effect upon the mediation process. '
"The confidentiality of the mediation negotiations should remain in-
violate until a written agreement is executed by the parties."62 Each party to
a court-ordered mediation has a privilege to prevent disclosure of the com-
munications made during the mediation proceeding.63 Other than an exe-
cuted settlement agreement, all oral and written communications are confi-
dential and inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding,
unless all parties otherwise agree.6' Courts will neither recognize oral media-
tion agreements nor hear testimony alleging their existence.65 In Hudson, the
wife and her attorney appeared at the final hearing for dissolution of mar-
riage alleging an oral mediated agreement and presenting an unsigned ver-
sion of the alleged agreement, with the mediator's signature on the back.'
Although the mediation agreement was never reduced to writing, and neither
the husband nor his attorney appeared at the final hearing, the trial court en-
mediation proceeding be confidential and inadmissible in subsequent legal proceedings. The
court ordered the parties to mediate at appellant's request. Id. at 726.
57. Paranzino, 690 So. 2d at 726.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 729-30.
60. Id. at 728.
61. Id. at 729; see also Floyd v. St. Johns County Fla., 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 440 (7th
Cir. Feb. 24, 1998).
62. Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Cohen v. Cohen,
609 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9).
63. Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 8 (citing FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (Supp. 1990)).
64. Id.
65. Id at 9.
66. Id. at 8.
[Vol. 28: 1:87
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/5
FLORIDA MEDIA TION CASE LA W
tered a judgment and later denied the husband's motion to vacate. 67 The ap-
pellate court found that the admission of the "agreement" poisoned the well,
necessitating that the judgment be vacated and the matter be tried anew.6"
Disclosure of confidential mediation information has also been pro-
posed as possible justification for disqualifying judges.6'9 The Supreme Court
of Florida in Enterprise Leasing addressed the certified conflict "on the issue
of whether the disclosure of confidential mediation information to the trial
judge is in and of itself sufficient to disqualify the trial judge."7 ° The court
held "we approve the decision in Enterprise Leasing, which held a judge is
not automatically disqualified from presiding because of knowledge of con-
fidential mediation information, and disapprove the Fourth District's deci-
sion in Fabber to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion."' A
party seeking disqualification of a judge in a mediation context must allege
specific facts to demonstrate a reasonable belief he could not get a fair trial.72
Florida's supreme court recognized that confidentiality of the pro-
ceedings is crucial to mediation by mandating that '[i]f the parties
do not reach an agreement as to any matter as a result of media-
tion, the mediator shall report the lack of an agreement to the court
without comment or recommendation,' and by further requiring
that '[i]f an agreement is reached, it shall be reduced to writing.' 73
Comparable rules of procedure similarly restrict what a mediator may report
to the court for family 74 and dependency mediation. 75
Not only may mediators assert the confidentiality privilege on behalf of
the parties, mediators governed by the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-
Appointed Mediators have an affirmative obligation to do so, including mov-
ing for a protective order.7 6 In Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, the par-
67. Id
68. Hudson, 600 So. 2d at 9.
69. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2001).
70. Id. at 965.
71. Id. In Fabber v. Wessel, 604 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) the trial judge
was disqualified from continuing as judge on the case because in the course of denying a
motion to compel compliance with the settlement agreement, he was privy to the terms of the
parties' alleged agreement. Id. at 534.
72. Enterprise Leasing Co., 789 So. 2d at 968.
73. Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730) (emphasis in original).
74. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(f).
75. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(o).
76. "'A mediator shall maintain confidentiality of all information revealed during media-
tion except where disclosure is required by law." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS
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ties failed to reach a written agreement during court ordered mediation.77
Nonetheless, Royal Caribbean moved to enforce an oral mediation agree-
ment and subpoenaed the mediator to testify at the hearing on their motion.78
The court of appeal recognized that the privilege afforded to the parties in
mediation proceedings, and asserted by the mediator in the trial court, was
codified by the Florida Legislature. 79 Accordingly, it affirmed the trial
court's decision to grant the mediator's motion to quash the subpoena and to
refuse to hear testimony regarding the mediation.8°
In a second case involving Royal Caribbean, following court-ordered
circuit civil mediation, the mediator submitted a report to the court indicating
that the parties had reached total impasse on all issues.8 ' Royal Caribbean
moved to enforce settlement, claiming that a settlement was reached by the
parties and sought to have the court review a document purporting to be the
settlement agreement.82 The appellate court found that the trial court had
departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering an in camera
inspection of the purported agreement and holding an evidentiary hearing on
Royal Caribbean's motion." "In order for a settlement agreement reached
during mediation to be binding, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730 clearly mandates that it
be reduced to writing and executed both by the parties and their respective
counsel, if any."84 If the parties do not effectuate an agreement in accor-
dance with the dictates of rule 1.730(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, "the confidentiality afforded to parties involved in mediation proceed-
ings must remain inviolate." 5
10.360. Additionally, "the mediator should not voluntarily testify, and, if subpoenaed, should
either file a motion for protective order, or notify the judge in accordance with local proce-
dures, that the mediator is statutorily required to maintain the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings." Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 96-005. This is an advisory
opinion issued by the Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, subsequently renamed Media-
tor Ethics Advisory Committee.
77. 614 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
78. Id
79. Id. at 520.
80. Id.
81. Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 641 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
82. Id
83. Id. at 517.
84. Id. Contra Jordan v. Adventist Health Sys., 656 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (enforcing mediation agreement signed by the parties, but not their counsel, when
parties operated under the terms of the mediation agreement).
85. Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517 (citing Royal Caribbean v. Modesto, 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
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Nonetheless, if the parties at mediation do not effectuate an agreement,
the real parties in interest, even if not present at the mediation proceedings,
are entitled to know about the issues in dispute and mediation efforts.86 In a
court-ordered mediation between a condominium association and a devel-
oper, the parties did not reach agreement. 7 Subsequent to the mediation, the
developer wrote a letter to the individual unit owners advising them of the
proceedings and the settlement offer the association had rejected.8 Revers-
ing the trial court's order imposing sanctions on the developer, the court of
appeal interpreted section 44.102(3) of the Florida Statutes to grant a privi-
lege to each party involved in a mediation proceeding, and found nothing in
the statute that precluded parties from disclosing communications to other
parties, whether present at or absent from the mediation proceeding.89
C. Rules of Procedure Impact Confidentiality
Executed mediated agreements survive the mediation process, but must
bear the requisite signatures to be recognized as valid by the courts.90 Rules
of procedure in conjunction with applicable substantive and mediation law
provide the answer as to who must sign the agreement. In the circuit civil
matter of City of Delray Beach v. Keiser, "[a]t the mediation, a handwritten
memorandum was prepared, which set forth the terms of a settlement."'" The
attorney for the City of Delray Beach signed the memorandum, but neither
party signed the document.9 2 Subsequent to the mediation, the City Commis-
sion declined to approve the settlement.93 The appellate court reasoned that
there was no mediation settlement agreement for rule 1.730 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties sign their mediation agree-
ment.9 4 Thus, the court of appeal found that the trial court erred in enforcing
the agreement.95 "[C]ounsel's signature, even when executed in the presence




89. Id. at 918-19.
90. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002). The privilege for court-ordered mediation provides
that "[a]ll oral or written communications in a mediation proceeding, other than an executed
settlement agreement .... shall be confidential and inadmissible as evidence in any subse-
quent legal proceeding, unless all parties agree otherwise." Id. See also additional mediation
privileges identified in notes 23-25 supra.
91. City of Delray Beach v. Keiser, 699 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
92. Id. at 856.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Keiser, 699 So. 2d at 855.
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of the party, was insufficient to satisfy the signature requirement of Rule
1.730. "96 Conversely, when the parties sign the mediation agreement but
counsel do not, the agreement may be upheld by the court.97 In Jordan v.
Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., the court found the lack of signatures
by counsel was a technical detail, and held that the parties' signatures were
sufficient to bind them to their settlement agreement when the parties had
operated under the terms of the agreement.9" While attorneys' signatures
may be a technical detail, parties' signatures are required on circuit civil me-
diated settlement agreements.
In determining whether mediated agreements should be recognized,
family law courts also look to requirements established by the applicable
rules of procedure. 99 In Graves v. Graves, the court held that the only way
the parties may enter into an enforceable agreement was to follow the rules
of procedure, and parties may not avoid the requirements by orally agreeing
to an alternative procedure during mediation.' °° During the mediation, the
parties reached an oral agreement which they recited before a court re-
porter.' O' The wife refused to sign the written agreement the husband's at-
torney prepared by incorporating the terms of the oral agreement.0 2 When
Graves was decided, family mediation matters were governed by Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. They are now governed by Florida Family Law
Rules of Procedure, which specifically address the matter raised in Graves,
and provide that the mediation agreement may be electronically or steno-
graphically recorded.'03
Attorneys and mediators must be well-versed in the rules of procedure
in their specific courts, for the various rules differ markedly. Florida Family
Law Rules of Procedure do not bind parties to the agreement if counsel was
not present when the mediation agreement was reached, and counsel serves a
written objection within ten days from service of a copy of the agreement.'0 4
Rules governing small claims actions do not require either parties or attor-
96. Id. (citing Gordon, 641 So. 2d at 517).
97. Jordan v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 656 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995), rev. denied 663 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1995).
98. Id. at 202.
99. Graves v. Graves, 649 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
100. Id. at 286.
101. Id. at 285.
102. Id.
103. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(f)(1) (2002).
104. Id.; see Kalof v. Kalof, 840 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (interpret-
ing this rule as applying to the limited circumstance in which counsel for one of the parties
leaves the mediation before the settlement agreement is ready, and not establishing a ten-day
window within which anyone present at mediation can move to set aside the agreement).
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neys to attend mediation if the party sends a representative with full authority
to settle.' °5 For dependency mediation, parties attending the mediation must
sign the written mediation agreement. 6 The parties and participants who
must attend are identified in the court order, which also names the parties
and participants who are prohibited from attending the mediation sessions.'0 7
D. Waiver of Privilege of Confidentiality
The parties to the mediation hold the mediation confidentiality privilege
and may elect to waive it. Should all parties involved in the mediation waive
the privilege, the mediator may not assert the privilege on anyone's behalf.
An individual party may intentionally or unintentionally waive the privilege.
In McKinlay v. McKinlay, the wife wrote a letter to her then-attorney inform-
ing him that the stipulation agreement she entered into during mediation was
not fair, that she was "under severe emotional distress," and pressured into
signing the agreement. '08 When the husband's counsel sought to have the
mediator testify in response to wife's allegations of intimidation and duress,
her counsel objected, asserting that mediation matters are privileged and con-
fidential.'0 9 "The trial court found that Wife had not waived her statutory
privilege," and refused to allow the mediator to testify or proffer testi-
mony." ° The court of appeal reversed and concluded "Wife waived her
statutory privilege of confidentiality and that, as a result of the waiver, it was
error and a breach of fair play to deny Husband the opportunity to present
rebuttal testimony and evidence." ' Similarly, another case held "it was
proper for the trial court to allow the former husband to testify about the me-
diation proceeding where the ... wife sought relief from the plain terms of
the settlement agreement .... ,,112 "A party seeking relief from a written set-
tlement agreement on the basis of his or her intent [or] thoughts at the time
the agreement was entered into may not assert that matters discussed during
the negotiations of that agreement are privileged."' 3
105. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e).
106. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(o)(1).
107. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290 (1)(1).
108. Mckinlay v. Mckinlay, 648 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
109. Id. at 808.
110. Id. at 809.
111. Id. at 810.
112. Taylor v. Taylor, 650 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
113. Id. (citing Mckinlay v. Mckinlay, 648 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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The mediation confidentiality privilege extends to physical evidence." 4
In Chabad House-Lubavitch v. Banks, the court of appeal found the trial
court had erred in admitting into evidence the site plan that was a direct
product of the parties' mediation." 5 Had the site plan been otherwise dis-
coverable the result would have been different for the mediation privilege,
applying only to mediation communications, does not suspend discovery or
prevent the introduction of otherwise discoverable evidence.'6 In fact, in-
formation obtained during mediation may lead to additional discovery re-
quests, and may form the basis for appropriate motions.' 7 In Broward
School Board v. Cruz, the School Board received at mediation, for the first
time, a report from the Plaintiffs neuropsychologist." 8 The report consti-
tuted otherwise discoverable evidence, and is therefore distinguishable from
the site plan in Chabad.' Previously, the trial court had denied the School
Board's request for an independent medical examination of the Plaintiff,
based on Plaintiffs representation that he had not placed his neurological
condition at issue, had not retained a neurologist, and did not intend to pre-
sent testimony from a neurologist. 20 The court of appeal found: "[b]ecause
the cause of Cruz's mental condition and, specifically, the change, if any, in
his neurological state, was the central issue in this trial, the School Board
should have been allowed the opportunity to have its own expert conduct an
independent [medical] examination.''
An ever-growing body of mediation case law responds to the parties'
various pleas for court intervention to correct, modify, or set aside mediation
agreements. When courts look behind the mediation agreements and take
testimony from the parties as to what transpired at mediation, they cast aside
confidentiality. In Haffa v. Haffa, the wife alleged that the mediation agree-
ment contained a serious scrivener's error, reflecting that her husband was to
transfer twenty-five shares of stock to her, when they had agreed the number
114. Chabad House-Lubavitch v. Banks, 602 So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
115. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2002); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710(c); FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.741(a).
117. In contrast, hearsay evidence as to information learned at mediation is inadmissible.
See Price v. City of Boynton Beach, 847 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
("[t]estimony of a witness that a... mediator had expressed concerns about threats made by a
[party] was inadmissible as hearsay").
118. 761 So. 2d 388, 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000), a.f'd, 800 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2001).
119. The site plan in Chabad was a mediation communication and therefore protected by
the mediation privilege. The doctor's report in Cruz existed independent of the mediation,
was not covered by the privilege, and was otherwise discoverable.
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was 2,505.2' The wife's attorney subpoenaed the mediator to testify. Over
the mediator's objection, the circuit court judge ordered the mediator to tes-
tify on the limited issue of the alleged scrivener's error.
23
Courts balance the benefit of honoring confidentiality with the detri-
ment of denying a party the opportunity to seek the relief of modifying or
setting aside the mediation agreement. In D.R. Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart
U.S.A. of West Palm Beach, the court of appeal directly addressed the issue
of confidentiality, focusing on whether the mediation resulted in an executed
settlement agreement. 1
24
The reason for confidentiality as to statements made during media-
tion where a settlement agreement is not reached is obvious. Me-
diation could not take place if litigants had to worry about admis-
sions against interest being offered into evidence at trial, if a set-
tlement was not reached. Once the parties in mediation have
signed an agreement, however, the reasons for confidentiality are
not as compelling. There is, of course, no confidentiality as to "an
executed settlement agreement."' 
25
Courts have given parties the opportunity to prove, among other mat-
ters, fraud, 12 6 extortion, 27 mutual mistake, 28 misrepresentation, 21 and media-
tor misconduct"' as bases for seeking relief from mediation agreements. The
section after next will discuss cases pertaining to mediation agreements, in-
terpreted, modified, upheld, or overturned by the courts.
111. APPEARANCE AT MEDIATION
A. Obligation to Attend Mediation
The term "voluntary court-ordered mediation" seems oxymoronic.
While the process of mediation may occur by operation of law, parties de-
termine their level of participation. Judges do order parties to attend media-
tion sessions. However, once at mediation, the parties have self-
122. Haffa v. Haffa, No. 93-13422-FC12 (Fla. 1 1th Cir. Ct. 1994). Conversation with
mediator Meah R. Tell on September 17, 2003.
123. Id.
124. 819 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
125. Id. at 973-74 (citing FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2001)).
126. Gostyla v. Gostyla, 708 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
127. Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
128. D.R. Lakes, Inc., 819 So. 2d at 974.
129. Still v. Still, 835 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
130. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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determination and decide whether they will settle all, some, or none of the
matters in controversy.' 3' Florida courts have sternly sanctioned both parties
and attorneys who failed to attend court-ordered mediation sessions. Sanc-
tions include case dismissal, struck pleadings, attorney's fees, and costs
charged against attorneys or clients. With the widespread utilization of me-
diation and relatively new proliferation of rules of procedure specifically
geared to the mediation process, case law clarifies the attorney's obligation
to attend and advise clients to attend mediation. Attorneys who improperly
advise their clients run the risk of irate clients sanctioned by the court and
diminished coffers following their personal assessment.
For circuit civil court-ordered mediation, attorneys representing parties
have an obligation to both attend and have their clients attend.'32 In Carbino
v. Ward, the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida found that defendant
Ward failed to appear at mediation without good cause despite the fact that
he, in good faith, relied on his attorney's advice that he need not attend. 33
The appellate court further found that the trial court, upon motion, was obli-
gated to award attorney's fees and costs against the party failing to appear. 31
"To hold otherwise would substantially weaken the sanction mechanism
which the Supreme Court saw fit to make mandatory upon a party's failure to
appear at mediation without good cause."' 35 For circuit civil cases,
a party is deemed to appear at a mediation conference if the fol-
lowing persons are physically present:
(I) The party or its representative having full authority to settle
without further consultation;
(2) The party's counsel of record, if any;
(3) A representative of the insurance carrier for any insured party
who is not such carrier's outside counsel and who has full author-
131. FLA. R.CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.3 10.
132. Rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure delineates who must attend
circuit civil (civil cases over $15,000) mediations. Court orders or stipulations by parties may
alter the requirements. Id.
133. 801 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
134. Id. at 1031. Rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides "if a
party fails to appear at a duly noticed mediation conference without good cause, the court
upon motion shall impose sanctions, including an award of mediator and attorneys' fees and
other costs, against the party failing to appear."
135. Carbino, 801 So. 2d at 1031.
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ity to settle up to the amount of the plaintiffs last demand or pol-
icy limits, whichever is less, without further consultation.'
36
The Carbino court was the first Florida court to address the question of
whether a defendant needs to personally appear for mediation when his in-
surance company sends a representative with full authority to settle up to
policy limits. 3 7 Interpreting rule 1.720(b), it answered in the affirmative,
finding that persons from all three applicable categories were required to be
present at the mediation. 3 Specifically, the court found that sub-section
(b)(1) applied "to a party such as a corporation, partnership, incapacitated
person, or minor which must appear through a duly authorized representa-
tive.' 39 Further, the court found the adjuster, while meeting the settlement
requirements of subsection (3), did not meet the requirements of subsection
(1) for his authority was only up to policy limits and Plaintiffs' demand was
not so limited. 4°
Whether a party, representative, or attorney needs to appear at media-
tion depends on the governing court order and rules of procedure and prac-
tice. The Supreme Court of Florida adopts the rules of practice and proce-
dure for conduct of court-ordered mediation.' 4 ' The most demanding rule
requiring appearance at mediation applies to circuit civil mediation mat-
ters. 42 The Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure governing appearance at
mediation only requires that the named party be physically present at the
mediation conference, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties. ' 43 Counsel
is not obligated to attend in the discretion of the mediator and with agree-
ment by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.'44 Appearances at
dependency mediation are both ordered and prohibited by the court.' 4' The
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure direct the court to enter an order naming
parties and participants who must appear, as well as parties and participants
136. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
137. Carbino, 801 So. 2d at 1030.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1031.
140. Id.; see also Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-002 (July 3, 1999); Mediator
Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-010 (March 22, 2002); Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 2002-001 (March 22, 2002).
141. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(1) (2002).
142. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b).
143. FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.740(d).
144. Id. Rule 12.741(2) provides for mandatory sanctions against a party who fails to
appear at a duly noticed mediation conference without good cause.
145. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.290(l).
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who are prohibited from attending the mediation.'46 Unlike the other media-
tion sessions requiring the appearance of parties, in small claims actions an
attorney may appear on behalf of a party at mediation if he has full authority
to settle without further consultation. 4 7 A nonlawyer may also appear on
behalf of a party with written authority to appear and full authority to settle
without further consultation. 48
Courts are sanctioning parties for failing to attend mediation sessions
based on their court orders, as well as applicable rules of procedure. In
Transglobal Land Trust v. Balamour, the court dismissed the landlord tenant
case with prejudice for the plaintiff landlord's failure to attend the court or-
dered mediation and subsequent failure to show cause why the case should
not be dismissed for his nonappearance.'49 Similarly, parties who fail to
abide by a court order to attend appellate mediation are subject to sanctions,
including the award of attorney's fees and mediator fees. 50 A party's obliga-
tion to obey a court order to attend mediation is not negated by presence at
the mediation by counsel with full authority to settle.' 5'
Attorneys are also the object of court sanctions for their mediation er-
rors. Although rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure only
provides for sanctioning parties who fail to appear,' 52 trial courts have the
inherent authority to appropriately assess attorney's fees and costs.'53 Attor-
neys who fail to attend court-ordered mediation and advise their clients that
they need not attend may face attorneys' fees and costs assessed against them
in favor of the opposing party.'54 Similarly, attorneys who fail to timely file
mediation summaries without good cause may face the imposition of sanc-
tions personally against them.' 55 When the attorney is the transgressor, "it is
more appropriate to impose sanctions against counsel rather than dismiss the
appeal, as dismissal would punish the client for the transgressions of her at-
torney.
'156
146. Id. Rule 8.290(l)(5) authorizes sanctions against a party or participant who was or-
dered to attend mediation, but failed to do so without good cause. The court, in its discretion,
may impose sanctions.
147. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.750(e).
148. Id.
149. Transglobal Land Trust v. Balamour, 9 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 202 (17th Cir. Ct. Jan.
14,2002).
150. Segui v. Margrill, 844 So. 2d 820, 821 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
151. Id.
152. Fredericks v. Sturgis, 598 So. 2d 94, 96 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Nunes v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 703 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
154. Id.; see also Dunning v. Metro. Ins. Co., 10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 39 (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct.
Nov. 6, 2002).
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Trial courts must find a sufficiently high level of misconduct by the
party to justify the severe sanction of striking his pleadings.'1 7 In Williams v.
Udell, the trial court abused its discretion by striking appellant's pleadings
for failing to attend mediation and properly reply to a request for production,
when both incidents of misconduct were attributed to the attorney's derelic-
tion of duty.'58 If a court enters a default judgment against a party for failure
to attend a court-ordered mediation, the default order "must contain specific
findings of the noncomplying party's willful or deliberate refusal to obey the
court order."' 59 Additionally, the severe sanction of striking pleadings be-
comes subject to heightened scrutiny when matters such as child custody and
support are at issue. 60
B. Authority to Settle at Mediation
Key to a determination of whether the appropriate people appeared for
mediation is whether they had the requisite authority to settle. No statute,
rule, or court order requires that parties settle during mediation sessions.
"There is no requirement that a party even make an offer at mediation, let
alone offer what the opposition wants to settle."'' Courts and rules may
require authority to settle; they do not require intent to settle, let alone actual
settlement. Florida's statutory definition of mediation clearly states, "deci-
sion making authority rests with the parties."' 62
Courts have levied sanctions against parties who sent representatives to
mediation without authority to settle. In Physicians Protective Trust Fund v.
Overman, the circuit court judge ordered the entire board of trustees to attend
the resumption of mediation after the self-insured trust failed to send a repre-
sentative with authority to settle the case to the court-ordered mediation.' 63
The court of appeal held the lower court had not departed from the essential
157. Williams. v. Udell, 690 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
158. Id. at 732-33.
159. Rodriguez v. Kalish, 766 So. 2d 411, 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); see also
Smith v. Wal-Mart, 835 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing trial court's dis-
missal of case and remanding for an explicit determination whether party's failure to attend
mediation was willful).
160. Brownell v. Brownell, 685 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
161. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
162. FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2002).
163. 636 So. 2d 827, 827-29 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The mediator had adjourned
the mediation because the representative from Physicians Protective Trust had no dollar au-
thority to settle the case. Subsequently, the Overmans filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to
rule 1.720(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
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requirements of law and declined to interfere by certiorari." Similarly, in
Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, the trial court sanctioned the petitioner for
sending a representative and an attorney to mediation who were not author-
ized to pay anything to settle the case. 165 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal denied the petition for writ of certiorari seeking to overturn the court
order. 166 Chief Justice (then Judge) Anstead, dissenting, aptly noted:
Mediation is an excellent means of providing the parties with an
opportunity to come together in a non-adversarial setting under the
guidance of an expert at dispute resolution to determine if they can
agree to a solution of their dispute without the need for a full-
blown court trial and all the baggage and risks such a trial in-
volves. 1
67
He continued: "However, mediation is not designed to force a settle-
ment in any case, especially those cases where the lines are so clearly and
solidly drawn that the parties, in absolute faith, simply take diametrically
opposed positions that ultimately require a court-imposed resolution after a
trial on the merits."'1
68
Judge Anstead had highlighted the importance of parties' self-
determination in the mediation process.69 Precisely because mediation of-
fers the opportunity to come together and share information and perspectives,
parties may alter their once diametrically opposed positions. For mediation
to truly offer a settlement opportunity, the parties must have the ability to
change their minds, should they see fit. Consequently, sending people who
have "marching orders" not to settle is a waste of the participant's time and
energy. 7° On the other hand, sending people who decide not to settle after
participating in the mediation is most appropriate.
Court orders may equate failing to appear for mediation without full au-
thority to settle with failing to appear at all.' 7' Consequently, if parties reach
agreement, they may not later look to overturn it based on inadequate author-
164. Id. at 829.
165. Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d 519, 519 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(per curiam).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 5 19-20 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 520.
169. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.310.
170. See FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.720(b) (setting attendance requirements and mandatory sanc-
tions).
171. W. Waste Indus., Inc. v. Achord, 632 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
[Vol. 28:1:87
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ity to settle. 7 2 "Since agreement was reached by the parties at mediation, it
is nonsensical to say that petitioner was not present at mediation.'"
IV. COURTS SEEK TO UPHOLD MEDIATION AGREEMENTS
A. Mediation Environment
Inevitably, when people enter into settlement agreements, some will try
to renege on their agreements. Courts will honor the parties' fundamental
right to contract and enforce the contracts even when the bargain seems to
favor one side. 74 "The incentive to file an action, impulsively settle, then
challenge the settlement after final judgment would permit parties to manipu-
late the privileges of litigation, waste judicial resources, and compromise
finality in these judgments."'' 75
Parties looking to overturn settlement agreements have limited bases for
doing so. "In fact, the reasons for such limitations are even more compelling
in the case of a mediated settlement agreement."'' 76 In Crupi v. Crupi, the
appellate court, determining whether to enforce a marital settlement, agreed
with the trial court "that three Xanax pills, and anxiety and pressure to settle
are insufficient proof of coercion necessary to set aside such an agreement.
Otherwise, few, if any, mediated settlement agreements would be enforce-
able."' 177 Identifying the safeguards available to litigating parties who par-
ticipate in court-ordered mediation, another court said, "[m]ediation agree-
ments are reached under court supervision, before a neutral mediator. The
mediation rules create an environment intended to produce a final settlement
of the issues with safeguards against the elements of fraud, overreaching,
etc., in the settlement process."'171 Courts have also given weight to other
factors usually present in court-ordered mediation cases, including represen-
tation by counsel and access to discovery, experts, and the court. 179 Addi-
172. Id. at 681-82.
173. ld. at 682 n. 1.
174. Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 913 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
175. Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 713 (Fla. 2001).
176. Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611,614 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id.
178. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
179. See Petracca, 706 So. 2d at 904. The parties reached a settlement agreement in their
dissolution of marriage action after engaging in discovery for two years with each continu-
ously represented by counsel, and the wife having hired an accountant to determine the fam-
ily finances. Id. Although the Petracca parties did not reach their agreement through media-
tion, the factors the court considers (distinguishing pre- and post-litigation) are factors usually
present in court-ordered mediation cases. Id. at 905-06. See also Macar, 803 So. 2d at 707.
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tionally, courts will consider that the parties voluntarily entered into a media-
tion agreement.i18
B. Intent to be Bound by the Mediation Agreement
To display the parties' intent to reach a final settlement, mediated
agreements must be in writing, although they may be handwritten. 8 ' Fur-
ther, the agreements need to bind the parties as to the essential terms,8 2 but
may be "bare bones" agreements.8 3 When parties disagree, courts determine
whether or not they meant to be bound by the terms of their agreements. In a
dependency matter, parents who were represented by counsel entered into a
mediation agreement with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Ser-
vices ("HRS"), consenting to the withholding of adjudication of dependency
for the children provided the parents complied with specific tasks.' 4 Shortly
thereafter, HRS filed an affidavit alleging parents' noncompliance, and
moved for an adjudication of dependency.'8 5 The trial court, following a
hearing on the matter, issued an order declaring the children dependent. 6
While acknowledging that the mediation agreement was not a model of clar-
ity, the appellate court denied parents' motion for rehearing, having deter-
mined that the parents had agreed to forgo procedures they would otherwise
have been entitled to for the dependency proceedings, and had also agreed
that should they fail to comply with the mediation agreement their children
would be adjudicated dependent.'
Nonetheless, mediated agreements may not be used to deny parents
substantive due process rights in termination of parental rights cases."'
180. In re BB., 820 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The court expressed
great distress "by the ease with which the father [was] permitted to needlessly expend the
scant resources of the DCF and the dependency court... with insufficient evidence in an
effort to renege on a mediated settlement agreement he voluntarily entered into with the
child's mother." Id.
181. Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing
handwritten agreements); Wilson v. Forte Hotels, Inc., 632 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (reversing trial court's order enforcing alleged mediation agreement that was not in
writing); Cohen v. Cohen, 609 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring mediated
agreements to be written).
182. Bowen v. Larry Gross Constr., 781 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
183. Stempel v. Stempel, 633 So. 2d 26, 26-27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
184. A.G. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 716 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
185. Id. at 793.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 794.
188. In re S.S., 723 So. 2d 344, 347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
[Vol. 28:1:87
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"Substantive due process requires that grounds for termination of parental
rights be shown by clear and convincing evidence before the State may sever
the rights of a parent in their natural child."' 89 Construing a mediation agree-
ment in a termination of parental rights case, the district court of appeal ex-
pressed concern with the mediated consent-to-termination clause.' 90 The
court was troubled by the judge's decision to terminate parental rights based
on three weeks of noncompliance with a portion of the agreement, when the
mediation agreement provided a ninety day period within which to satisfy the
agreement's requirements, and the hearing was held less than ninety days
from the date of the agreement.' 9' Despite the mediation agreement with its
consent-to-termination of parental rights clause, the trial court had the obli-
gation to consider the best interests of the children, and the state retained the
burden to establish the elements required for termination of parental rights
cases.'92 As the record did not support the termination of parental rights, the
case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 93
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the court was called upon to
determine if a provision in a handwritten mediated agreement was an agree-
ment between the parties or merely their agreement to agree in the future.'94
The mediation agreement read: 'The parties agree to a ninety day per year
cumulative cohabitation clause the exact language of which shall be agreed
upon by counsel and the parties."" 95 Finding reversible error by the trial
court, the court of appeal concluded that the provision, located in a mediated
agreement that was admitted into evidence at trial and incorporated into the
final judgment, was an agreement that had gone into effect.'96 Furthermore,
by virtue of its incorporation, the mediation "agreement was elevated to the
status of judgment to be interpreted, rather than a contract to be enforced."' 97
C. Finality of Mediation Agreements
Settlements are highly favored, and courts will seek to enforce them




192. Id. at 346.
193. In re S.S., 723 So. 2d at 347.




198. Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985); Treasure Coast v. Lud-
lum Constr. Co., 760 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Murchinson v.
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tion contemplates a prompt and final resolution of the case." ' "The fact
that one party to the agreement apparently made a bad bargain is not suffi-
cient ground, by itself, to vacate or modify a settlement agreement. ' '200 "Nor
is the fact that the complaining party has received incompetent legal advice a
basis for vacating an agreement in a dissolution proceeding. '20' In Tubbs v.
Tubbs, the court of appeal instructed the trial court to enforce the parties'
handwritten mediation agreement, signed by the parties, their attorneys, and
the mediator, despite the fact the agreement appeared to be slanted in favor
of the husband. 2
"[C]ases settled in mediation are especially unsuited for the liberal ap-
plication of a rule allowing recission of a settlement agreement based on
unilateral mistake. °20 3  In Sponga v. Warro, during mediation, the parties
settled a negligence suit arising from a car accident for $12,500.204 Alleging
mistake or "newly discovered evidence," Ms. Warro sought relief from
judgment based on her doctor's serious error regarding her injuries, and her
reliance on his erroneous report.05 Following mediation, her doctor cor-
Grand Cypress Hotel, 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11 th Cir. 1994); see also Metro. Dade County v.
Fonte, 683 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
199. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1996).
200. Tubbs v. Tubbs, 648 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Casto v.
Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987)); Micale v. Micale, 542 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), rev. dismissed, 548 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1989); Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271,
274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
201. Tubbs, 648 So. 2d. at 818 (citing Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334; Cladis, 512 So. 2d at
274)).
202. Id. The Tubbs court used the Casto test in determining whether to set aside the par-
ties' settlement agreement. Id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida in Macar v.
Macar, 803 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2001) addressed the issue of whether final judgments which
incorporate marital settlement agreements achieved after commencement of litigation should
be subject to challenges based on Casto v. Casto, 608 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987). Macar, 803 So.
2d at 708-09. The court concluded that they were not, and should be controlled by Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. Id. at 709. See also Casto, 508 So. 2d at 330, for two grounds
established by the Supreme Court to set aside or invalidate a postnuptial agreement:
(I )"fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching" by a party in reaching
the agreement, and (2) "unfair or unreasonable provision for [a] spouse" given the parties'
circumstances. Casto, 508 So. 2d at 333. Once the spouse establishes that the agreement is
unreasonable, a presumption exists that either (a) the defending spouse concealed information,
or (b) the challenging spouse lacked knowledge. The defending spouse then has the burden to
rebut the presumption by showing (a) full, frank disclosure of marital property and income of
parties to challenging spouse prior to signing agreement, or (b) general knowledge by the
challenging spouse of the parties' income and general and approximate knowledge of the
marital property. Id.
203. Sponga v. Warro, 698 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997).
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rected his report, finding (for the first time) a preexisting condition aggra-
vated by the accident for which he anticipated future treatment.2" The court
of appeal declined to apply the concept of newly discovered evidence, and
determined that Ms. Warro entered into the mediated settlement agreement
based on unilateral mistake.0 7 As a matter of law, the court concluded that
she was not entitled to withdraw her settlement agreement based on errors in
her doctor's report.2"8 "The decision to engage in mediation and to settle at
mediation means that remedies and options otherwise available through the
judicial system are foregone."20 9 "The finality of it once the parties have set
down their agreement in writing is critical."
' 10
"Mediation, like arbitration, is an alternative dispute resolution device.
It is not to be engaged in casually or carelessly."2 ' A heightened standard of
review applies when courts consider vacating a final judgment that followed
a mediated settlement agreement. 2 2 When a trial court sets aside a judgment
based on a settlement agreement, it is also setting aside the agreement en-
tered into by the parties. "[M]ore stringent principles of law apply in setting
aside a contract than in setting aside a judgment."2"3
As parties rely on the finality of their mediation agreements, third par-
ties may also rely on the agreements to seek court determination of their
rights. 2I4 In Robbins v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., the insurance
company brought an action for declaratory judgment to establish its right to
continue to sell insurance to the former wife who was insuring her former
husband's life.215 Based on the parties' mediation agreement, the former
wife had an insurable interest in the life of her former husband.1 6 She was,
therefore, allowed to purchase policies insuring his life totaling $200,000.2,7
In another dissolution of marriage matter, parties stipulated during "media-
tion that the husband would maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of
$200,000 naming the minor children as beneficiaries. 2' 8 The trial court's
206. Id.
207. Id. at 624.
208. Sponga, 698 So. 2d at 625.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Tilden Groves Holding Corp. v. Orlando/Orange County Expressway, 816 So. 2d
658, 660 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Sponga, 698 So. 2d at 625 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998)).
212. Id.
213. Id. (referencing Smiles v. Young, 271 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
214. Robbins v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 802 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
215. Id. at 477.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Burton v. Burton, 697 So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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decision to require the husband to maintain only $100,000 in insurance was
reversible error.219
D. Enforcement of Mediation Agreements
When enforcing settlement agreements, courts may not fashion their
own remedies.2 In Treasure Coast v. Ludlum Construction, the parties fol-
lowing mediation reached a settlement, which provided in relevant part: "If
any payment is more than ten days late then the Plaintiff will be entitled to a
judgment upon Affidavit against the Defendant for $65,000.00 less payments
made. '22 Subsequent to Ludlum making payment seven days beyond the ten
day grace period, Treasure Coast moved for final judgment.222 Finding that
entry of an order for the full amount shocked its conscience, the trial court
ordered Ludlum to pay interest on its late payment.223 Consequently, the
court of appeal held that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the unam-
biguous terms of the agreement, and in substituting its own remedy.224
Similarly, the trial court cannot "interfere with the parties' agreement
by finding it unconscionable and refusing to enforce it. ' 25 In Wells v. Wells,
the parties, both of whom were represented by counsel, entered into a media-
226tion agreement. Pursuant to the agreement:
the husband was to have the exclusive use and possession of the
marital home but, . . . in the event he were ever thirty days late in
any child support payment, the husband would forfeit his interest
in the home and quit-claim it to the wife (unless the lateness were
due to injury or disability, in which case the home would be sold
and the proceeds divided equally between the parties).227
The mediation agreement also provided that the husband would transfer
to the wife the $15,863.54 balance in an annuity fund, and if the annuity de-
creased in value, the husband would pay the difference in value to the
wife. 228 The agreement specifically stated that the transfer of the annuity
219. Id.
220. Treasure Coast v. Ludlum Constr. Co., 760 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
221. Id. at 233.
222. Id. at 233-34.
223. Id. at 234.
224. Id.
225. Wells v. Wells, 832 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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balance was "in full and complete payment of any child support arrearage"
through the execution date of the mediation agreement.
2 29
The trial court found that the former husband owed the former wife
$696 (the decrease in value of the annuity).2 3' The trial court characterized
the $696 payment as a property settlement, and determined that a judgment
in that amount could be entered against the husband, but he could not be held
in contempt.2 3' The court of appeal disagreed, reasoning that since the obli-
gation was "made to discharge the husband's child support arrearage, it was
enforceable by contempt. "232
"Despite the trial court's determination that the husband was more than
thirty days late in paying child support, the court refused to enforce that por-
tion of the mediation agreement, sua sponte finding it unconscionable. 2 33
The court of appeal found no justification for the trial court's invalidation of
the mediation agreement.234
In sum, the former husband agreed to the marital settlement provi-
sion requiring him to transfer his interest in the marital home if he
made a child support payment thirty days or more late. He did not
challenge this provision either before or after it was incorporated
into the final judgment.235
"Bad domestic bargains-meaning unfair or unreasonable property and
monetary settlement agreements-are nevertheless enforceable so long as
they are knowing, voluntary, and not otherwise against public policy.
'
"236
Additionally, only when a term in a marital settlement agreement is am-
biguous may the trial court consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the lan-
guage in the agreement.237 In Levitt v. Levitt, the parties entered into a hand-
written mediation agreement, superseded by a marital settlement agreement
specifically stating that it was the entire agreement of the parties. 238 The
229. Id.
230. Wells, 832 So. 2d at 268.
231. Id.
232. Id.; see also Kea v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing
trial court's finding of contempt because contempt is only proper if the unpaid debt is for
alimony or child support, and husband's debt, as defined in the mediation agreement, was
neither).
233. Wells, 832 So. 2d at 268.
234. Id. at 269.
235. Id.
236. Id. (quoting Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(discussing Castro v. Castro, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987)).
237. Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d. 755, 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
238. Id. at 756.
2003]
31
Tetunic: Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Decades of Maturation
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LAW REVIEW
agreement provided "that the former husband [would] pay the balance of...
wife's attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed $12,500, and that 'payment
of this amount is subject to the [h]usband's review of and consent to the
[w]ife's attorney's billing records, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld.' '23 9 Finding the attorney's fee provision ambiguous, the trial court
reviewed extrinsic evidence, and determined that the parties intended to have
a flat fee arrangement. 24' The court of appeal, construing the marital settle-
ment agreement as a matter of law, was "on equal footing with the trial court
as interpreter of the written document., 24' As the terms of the agreement
were clear and unambiguous, "the parties' intent must be gleaned from the
four comers of the document." 242 Accordingly, the case was reversed and
remanded for the trial court's determination of whether the former husband
reasonably or unreasonably withheld his consent to pay attorney's fees of the
former wife.243
Trial courts must enforce valid mediated settlement agreements in strict
accordance with their terms.2" It is error for a trial court to require a restric-
tive covenant in a deed when the mediation agreement only provided for
"immediate erection of a hog wire fence and the future erection of a chain
,,241link fence, or to require signing an easement which contained terms and
conditions parties had not agreed to in their mediated settlement agree-
ment.246 Courts of appeal similarly reverse family courts that do not follow
the plain language of the mediation agreements or go beyond the agreed-
upon language. When the mediation agreement provided that the husband
could claim tax deductions for the children as long as he was current in his
child support and alimony payments, the general master erred by ruling that
the husband was not entitled to take the tax deduction for his failure to pay
private school tuition.24 7 Similarly, when issues of child custody had been
satisfactorily resolved by the parties in their mediation agreement, and




242. Levitt, 699 So. 2d at 756.
243. Id. at 757.
244. M & C Assocs. v. State, 682 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
245. Boozer v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., 641 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
246. Sinclair v. Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 584 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
247. Layman v. Layman, 738 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). "The agree-
ment provided that the husband could claim the tax deductions if he was current in child sup-
port and alimony payments." Id. "The plain language of the agreement does not label the
husband's portion of the private school tuition as child support." Id.
[Vol. 28: 1:87
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interests, the court went beyond the agreement when it designated primary
and secondary residential parents.148 Nonetheless, the court of appeal de-
clined to disturb the judge's findings, reasoning that the designation of pri-
mary residential parent had no significance in the context of the final judg-
ment.249
E. Interpretation of Mediation Agreements
As with other settlement agreements, parties seek court intervention
when they disagree on the interpretation or implementation of their media-
tion agreements. In Broward County v. LaPointe, the parties settled their
eminent domain case in mediation, and their settlement terms were incorpo-
rated into a stipulated final judgment. 250 "The parties' settlement agreement
provided that the court was to reserve jurisdiction over the 'amount of all
reasonable costs and attorney's fees, including all costs of environmental
contamination issues.""'251 The court of appeal, construing the contract as a
matter of law, determined that since there was no facial ambiguity, the por-
tion of the agreement at issue must be afforded its plain meaning.252 Finding
the omission of 'attorney's fees' in the modifying clause (which only re-
ferred to 'costs') significant, the court of appeal construed the parties'
agreement to allow reimbursement for costs dealing with environmental con-
tamination issues, but not for attorney's fees for the "administrative and
regulatory process. '
In Dows v. Nike, Inc., "[b]oth [parties] contended that there was no am-
biguity in the settlement agreement and it should be enforced., 254 Further,
each side argued that their interpretation, based on the plain meaning of the
settlement agreement, should prevail.2 55
The parties had entered into a pre-suit mediation agreement that estab-
lished a three-tiered settlement structure dependent on an independent exam-
ining physician's opinions. 56 They subsequently entered into a final agree-
ment, superseding the original handwritten conceptual agreement, in which
they chose a physician who would answer specific questions that would de-
248. Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
249. Id. at 1052.
250. 685 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
251. ld. at 892.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 892-93.
254. Dows v. Nike, Inc. 846 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 597.
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termine the minor's compensation. 257 The parties agreed to ask the physician
(1) whether the minor ever suffered from osteomyelitis as a result of the in-
cident, and (2) if he suffered from osteomyelitis, whether he will require any
treatment to the injured area? 258 In the event the physician answered no to
the second question, the minor claimant and his guardian agreed to accept
$100,000.259 If however, the physician answered yes, they agreed to accept
$300,000.260
Nike argued that they were only responsible for paying $100,000 be-
cause the physician responded the child would not require further treatment
for osteomyelitis. 26' The Dows argued that Nike was required to pay
$300,000 because the physician answered that their son would require further
treatment to the injured area.262 The court of appeal did not read the question
as limiting future treatment for osteomyelitis only, reversed the trial court's
order compelling the $100,000 settlement, and directed the court to enter an
order directing Nike to pay the Dows $300,000.263
Courts may define terms in mediation agreements when parties have
failed to do so.2 6 They may also require renegotiation of settlement agree-
ments.265 A marital settlement agreement reached during mediation provided
that the husband would use his "best efforts" to complete a real estate pur-
chase within a specified period of time. 266 Further, "[tihe agreement pro-
vided that '[i]f despite all his best efforts and through no fault of his own, the
transaction shall not be closed, then the parties' marital settlement agreement
shall be subject to renegotiation."'2 67 Finding the husband was not obligated
to complete the transaction based on the circumstances, the court of appeal
concluded that the contingency in the agreement had occurred, necessitating
renegotiation of the marital settlement agreement.268
When parties use an undefined term in their mediation agreement, they
are bound by the interpretation which the court gives the term.269 In a medi-
257. Id. at 598.
258. Dows, 846 So. 2d at 598.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Jd. at 600.
262. Id.
263. Dows, 846 So. 2d at 601.
264. See Bowen v. Larry Gross Constr., Inc. 781 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
265. Faith v. Faith, 709 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
266. Id. at 600.
267. Jd. at 601.
268. Id.
269. See Bowen, 781 So. 2d at 466.
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ated agreement between a "homeowner" and a general contractor, the parties
entered into an agreement to "repair cracks in plaster., 27' The homeowner
wanted replacement of the drywall and plaster, while the contractor main-
tained that his repair would not be noticeable and would be permanent.27'
Although the parties did not agree on the definition of the term "repair" as
used in the mediation agreement, the court held them to their agreement.
2 72
Even though the details are not definitely fixed, an agreement may
be binding if the parties agree on the essential terms and seriously
understand and intend the agreement to be binding on them. A
subsequent difference as to the construction of the contract does
not affect the validity of the contract or indicate the minds of the
parties did not meet with respect thereto.
273
Parties to mediation agreements do not always agree on issues having to
do with breach or default, and resultant consequences or damages. Courts
determining whether mediation agreements have been materially breached
will look to the parties' agreement and the applicable established body of
law. In a landlord-tenant case, the appellate body (circuit court) found no
breach of the mediation agreement and no basis at law to uphold the default
judgment for eviction.274 Prior to the court hearing the landlord's complaint
for tenant eviction, the parties reached agreement at mediation and the case
was dismissed. 75 Pursuant to the mediation agreement, a breach of the
agreement provided for a reopening of the case, placing the parties in the
position they were prior to mediation.276 Therefore, as the landlord had not
given the notice required by statute prior to the suit, the defects could not be
corrected on remand, and even if the tenant had breached the agreement, the
court was not justified in automatically entering a default judgment.277 Con-
sequently, the appellate court ordered entry of judgment in favor of the ten-
ant.
278
In Spanish Broadcasting Systems of Florida, Inc. v. Grillone, the trial
court found that Spanish Broadcasting was "'in wilful breach of the terms of
the settlement agreement it entered into with [Grillone] at mediation and has
270. Id. at 465.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 466.
273. Id.
274. Hodgson v. Jones, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 758, 758-59 (17th Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 1999)
275. Id. at 758.
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indicated to the Court that it will not honor the terms of the mediation
agreement."'279 Consequently, the court of appeal found the trial court had
not abused its discretion in imposing sanctions and in declining to reduce the
amount of sanctions it had imposed against Spanish Broadcasting. 20 How-
ever, in another case involving the media, notwithstanding the fact that late
payment by an advertiser to a television station was in violation of their me-
diation agreement, the court found the advertiser was not in default.28 ' The
court reasoned that the-television station accepted payment and allowed the
advertisement, from which the advertiser could have concluded it was not in
default.28 2 Additionally, the court determined that at a minimum, the televi-
sion station had a duty to provide notice before seeking an ex parte final
judgment283 The court of appeal vacated the final judgment after default,
and notably, ordered the parties to comply with their mediation agreement.2s'
Similarly, in a family law matter, the court did not find the former hus-
band's two-day delay in making the first payment pursuant to the parties'
settlement agreement to be a material breach. 285  Distinguishing this case
from Treasure Coast v. Ludlum Construction Co.,286 the court noted that the
case at bar was not a commercial transaction, and further that the mediation
agreement did not specify that time was of the essence, and did not provide a
grace period to put the party on notice that a short delay would accelerate
payments or trigger default.287 Interestingly, in a circuit civil case between a
college and a former employee, the court of appeal considered the same fac-
tors and reached the same result, deciding the case consistent with the fam-
ily, rather than the commercial case.28 The parties' settlement agreement
reached at mediation provided that Edward Waters College would pay John-
son's back salary and wages in full by March 31, 1997.289 When the college
tendered payment one day late, Johnson invoked the default provision of the
agreement permitting entry of judgment in the amount of $250,000.290 De-
279. 731 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting the trial court).
280. Id.





285. Rose v. Ditto, 804 So. 2d 351, 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing Treasure
Coast v. Ludlum Constr. Co., 760 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
286. 760 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
287. Rose, 804 So. 2d at 353.
288. See Edward Waters Coll., Inc. v. Johnson, 707 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
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termining 1) that the settlement agreement contained no recital that time was
of the essence; 2) the College's failure caused no hardship; and 3) Johnson
made no post-default demand for payment, the court of appeal concluded any
breach which may have occurred was not material to the performance of the
contract.29'
F. Parties Decide Mediation Agreement Coverage and Terms
In mediation, parties may agree to resolve matters beyond those cogni-
zable in the underlying litigation. 92 In M & C Associates, Inc. v Florida
Department of Transportation, the parties resolved an eminent domain pro-
ceeding through mediation.293 The stipulated final judgment incorporated
their mediation agreement, in which they agreed that the court would "re-
serve jurisdiction to assess any damage to pool caused by construction., 294
The trial court struck M & C Associates' motion to enforce this provision
determining that construction costs were not recoverable in eminent domain
proceedings.295 Finding that the trial court and the parties were bound by the
agreement, the court of appeal reversed and remanded to the trial court with
instructions to address the pool damage claim.
296
The fact that construction damages are not generally recoverable
as severance damages is not a defense to enforcement of the set-
tlement agreement. There is no requirement that the terms of a set-
tlement agreement be confined to issues cognizable in the litiga-
tion giving rise to the dispute. In fact, cases are often settled pre-
cisely because the parties agree to assume obligations or confer
rights that a jury or the trial court would be unable to reach.297
This is particularly important in dissolution of marriage matters when
parties may wish to address issues such as children's higher education or
grandparents' visitation rights:
The bench and bar have for years now encouraged divorcing par-
ents to resolve their differences through mediation. In effect, par-
ents have been urged to make their own law, in the hope that they
291. Id.




296. Id. at 641.
297. M & C Assoc., 682 So. 2d at 640-41 (internal citations omitted).
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can better live with a decision that is their own, rather than a deci-
sion that is externally imposed.298
V. COURTS OVERTURN MEDIATION AGREEMENTS AS REQUIRED BY LAW
A. Mediator Misconduct
During settlement, the mediation process offers safeguards to the parties
that should decrease the occurrence of coercion and increase the likelihood
courts will enforce the agreements.2 99 The primary safeguard is the trained
neutral known as the mediator. Ironically, now courts which inject a media-
tor into the settlement process may provide a basis for overturning the me-
diation agreement. Courts may consider mediator misconduct during court-
ordered mediation as possible grounds for setting aside mediation agree-
ments.30 0 In Vitakis- Valchine v. Valchine, the wife sought to set aside a me-
diated settlement agreement reached after seven hours of mediation at which
both parties were represented by counsel. 30 ' The mediation resulted in a
302 wfcomprehensive twenty-three page agreement. The wife alleged, among
other things, that coercion and duress on the part of the mediator caused her
to enter into the mediation agreement.30 3 Correctly construing Florida law at
the time of the case, the trial judge found no basis for setting aside the set-
tlement due to alleged duress or coercion by a third party.3°4 In a thoughtful
well-reasoned opinion, Judge Stevenson, writing for the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, held a court may set aside an agreement reached through
court-ordered mediation if it finds that the agreement was reached as a direct
result of substantial mediator misconduct.
305
"During a court-ordered mediation, the mediator is no ordinary third
party, but is, for all intent and purposes, an agent of the court carrying out an
official court-ordered function. '3 6 "Comprehensive procedures for conduct-
298. Card v. Card, 706 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
299. See infra Section IV.A; see also FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.300,
10.310, 10.400, 10.410, 10.420.
300. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001), reh 'g
granted No. 4D00-2013, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 19262 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 25,
2001).




305. Valchine, 793 So. 2d at 1099. The court would determine whether the mediator
substantially violated the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, and
whether the agreement was reached as a direct result of the mediator misconduct. Id.
306. Id. at 1090.
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ing the mediation session and minimum standards for qualification, training,
certification, professional conduct, and discipline of mediators have been set
forth by the Florida Supreme Court in the Florida Rules for Certified and
Court Appointed Mediators ..... .30 Accordingly, the court of appeal con-
sidered it unconscionable to enforce a settlement agreement reached through
coercion by a court-appointed mediator, and held "that the court may invoke
its inherent power to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and its
processes by invalidating a court-ordered mediation settlement agreement
obtained through violation and abuse of the judicially-prescribed mediation
procedures. '"308
B. Extortion, Fraud, and Misrepresentation
Party wrongdoing also provides a basis for setting aside mediation
agreements. In Cooper v. Austin, during a lengthy mediation the wife sent
her husband a note which read: "If you can't agree to this, the kids will take
what information they have to whomever to have you arrested, etc.309 Al-
though I would get no money if you were in jail-you wouldn't also be living
freely as if you did nothing wrong."31 Shortly thereafter during the media-
tion session, the parties settled their property matters. 31' Following the
court's adoption of the mediation agreement, the husband sought relief from
the agreement alleging it was procured by extortion.1 2 Although the trial
court recognized the extortionate nature of the note, it declined to grant relief
determining that the agreement did not result from the wife's demands." 3
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, finding:
In this case, the wife's "wake-up call", which demanded the hus-
band either give in to her demands or go to jail, was clearly extor-
tionate and her presentation of the extorted agreement to the court
was a fraud on the court making the trial court an instrument of her
extortion. Mrs. Cooper should not profit from her actions. Nor
should this Court, or any court, ignore them.
314
307. Id. at 1098.
308. Id. at 1099.
309. 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 712.
313. Id. at 711.
314. Cooper, 750 So. 2d at 713.
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Neither will courts ignore parties' alleged fraudulent actions.3" 5 In
Gostyla v. Gostyla, the wife alleged that the former husband lied under oath
during the final hearing about matters not covered in the mediation agree-
ment, which the court approved and incorporated into its final judgment.316
The court of appeal found the trial court erred in denying the wife's motion
to set aside the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, and remanded for
an evidentiary hearing.3"7 A party who sufficiently alleges intrinsic fraud in a
motion to set aside a dissolution of marriage is entitled to a hearing on the
merits.318
Courts may also vacate mediation agreements and grant hearings for re-
lief from judgment based on parties' misrepresentation." 9 The court prop-
erly vacated the mediation settlement agreement when the evidence demon-
strated the former wife made false statements concerning a material fact,
knew the representation was false, intended the representation to induce reli-
ance by her former husband, and the former husband was injured by his reli-
ance on her representation."2 Similarly, a judgment debtor was entitled to a
hearing on his motion for relief from judgment when the creditor represented
the debtor defaulted on an obligation in their mediation agreement, but mis-
represented the true state of affairs to the court.321
C. Mediation Agreements May Not Violate the Law
Although parties may decide matters that judges and juries would not,
and may be creative in crafting resolutions unique to their needs, there are
some decisions they are not authorized to make. "The right to claim federal
income tax exemptions under provisions of the parties' marital settlement
agreement is one of law, not of fact." '322 Congress delegates to the Internal
Revenue Service the authority to interpret tax law and to prescribe rules and
regulations for that purpose.323 Congress specifically permits affected tax-
payers, through the exercise of private contract rights, to claim the depend-
315. Johnson v. Johnson, 738 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (granting the
wife leave to amend her motion to set aside the final judgment of dissolution of marriage to
allege fraud with greater particularity or have an evidentiary hearing on the merits).
316. 708 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
317. d. at 676.
318. Id. at 675.
319. Still v. Still, 835 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
320. Id.
321. Maresca v. Olivio, 819 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
322. Hoelzle v. Shapiro, 736 So. 2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
323. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2003).
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ency exemption.324 However, federal law prohibits the parties from agreeing
on head of household,3 25 dependent care credit,3 26 or earned income credit.327
Federal law does allow the parties to designate "that separate maintenance
payments are nondeductible by the payor and excludible from the gross in-
come of the payee., 328 Construing the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury
Regulations, the Supreme Court of Florida recently held that state courts may
order "that alimony payments... [be] excluded from the gross income of the
payee and not deducted by the payor.
'3 29
Bankruptcy matters, also governed by federal law, may not be decided
by parties or adjudicated by state judges based on state contract law. Bank-
ruptcy judges are not bound by parties' or state judges' characterizations of
obligations for purposes of determining dischargeability and exemptions.330
Nonetheless, bankruptcy judges may consider parties' unmet obligations in
state cases when determining bankruptcy matters.33 ' A party's failure to
comply with provisions in a mediation agreement incorporated into a final
judgment may evince fraud denying the debtor a general discharge in bank-
ruptcy.
332
State law also limits parties in the decisions they may make regarding
their children. Courts are the final authority on child custody and child sup-
port, considering the best interests of the child as the overriding factor.333 A
trial court may set an agreement aside if it is not in the best interests of the
children, and must admit evidence relevant to the best interests standard.334
Therefore, mediation agreement provisions having to do with child support
324. Hoelzle, 736 So. 2d at 1209 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 152 (e)(2)(A) (2000)). To claim the
dependency exemption, one must qualify. See I.R.C. §§ 151, 152 (2003) (listing the basic
rules for qualifying for the dependency exemption).
325. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2003) (listing head of household status which is based on principal
place of abode).
326. See I.R.C. § 21(e)(5) (2003) (listing the rules as to which parent qualifies for taking
the dependent care credit).
327. Hoelzle, 736 So. 2d at 1209; see I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A) (2003) (listing the rules as to
which parent qualifies for taking the earned income tax credit). There is also a child tax
credit. See I.R.C. § 24(c)(1)(A) (2003) (listing the rules as to which parent qualifies for taking
the child tax credit).
328. Rykiel v. Rykiel, 838 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Rykiel v. Rykiel, 795 So.
2d 90, 93 n.l (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-1T, A-8)); see also I.R.C.
§ 71(b)(1)(B) (2003).
329. Rykiel, 838 So. 2d at 511-12.
330. In re Ellertson, 252 B.R. 831, 833 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
331. Rykiel, 838 So. 2d at 511-12.
332. See Shingledecker v. Shingledecker, 242 B.R. 80 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
333. See Wayno v. Wayno, 756 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
334. See Feliciano v. Feliciano, 674 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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and visitation are not subject to the same enforceability as alimony and mari-
tal property provisions.335 Further, the court has an obligation to consider the
availability and propriety of health insurance for the parties' minor children
even if the parties did not include such a provision in their mediation agree-
ment.336 Additionally, courts are not bound by parents' mediation agree-
ments as to reunification with their children. 337 "The ultimate determination
on reunification would be for the trial court.
33 8
Courts must also follow the strict procedural requirements and findings
set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida before permitting Human Leuko-
cyte Antigen ("HLA") testing even when the parties have agreed to the test-
ing in their mediation agreement. 339 "Once children are born legitimate, they
have a right to maintain that status both factually and legally if doing so is in
their best interests. '340 Additionally, the child's father has an "unmistakable
interest in maintaining the unimpugned relationship with his child., 34' The
courts' obligation to protect children extends to non-domestic relations cases.
In Hernandez v. United Contractors Corp., the children's mother settled a
wrongful death action on their behalf with the workers' compensation carrier
at mediation.3 42 "No guardian was appointed to represent the children in the
workers' compensation proceeding. Absent a determination that the settle-
ment was in the minor children's best interests, the settlement was inva-
lid. 34
3
D. Mutual Mistake and Lack of Consideration
In a recent case of first impression, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of "whether the [mediation] privilege applies where there
335. Id.
336. See Butler v. Butler, 622 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
337. L.F. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 837 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
338. Id.
339. Ownby v. Ownby, 639 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The husband
brought a dissolution of marriage action which by order of the court went to mediation. Id. at
136. During mediation, the parties entered into an agreement stipulating to HLA blood testing
to determine the paternity of the youngest of their six children. Id. The husband contends he
is the biological father of the six children, and further contends that even if he is not the bio-
logical father of the youngest child, he is the legal father because the parties considered him to
be the father. Id.
340. Id. at 137 (quoting Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305, 307
(Fla. 1993)).
341. Ownby,639So.2dat 137.
342. 766 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
343. Id. at 1252.
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has been a mutual mistake in a settlement agreement., 344 Following media-
tion, the parties settled a suit for specific performance. 34 5 The seller sought
relief from the settlement agreement claiming it contained a $600,000 cleri-
cal error.346 Accordingly, the seller appealed the trial court's decision "that
the statutory mediation privilege of confidentiality precluded evidence as to
what occurred in mediation, leaving seller without the means to prove that
there had been such an error." 317 Acknowledging that confidentiality is nec-
essary to the mediation process, the court of appeal found that once the par-
ties in mediation have signed an agreement, the reasons to retain confidenti-
ality are not as compelling.348 Addressing the constitutional right to go to
court to resolve disputes, the court said,
We cannot imagine that the legislature intended that a party to a
contract reached after mediation should not have the same access
to the courts to correct a $600,000 mutual mistake, as a party en-
tering into the same contract outside of mediation. We therefore
hold that the privilege does not bar evidence as to what occurred at
mediation under the facts in this case.349
Within two months of deciding its first case using mutual mistake as a
basis for correcting a mediation agreement, the same court decided a second
case involving the same issue. In Feldman v. Kritch, the parties reached
settlement at their second mediation.35" The agreement provided: "State
Farm to pay plaintiff $75,000 by 2:00 p.m. on 7/20/01. Plaintiff to execute
full release and file dismissal with prejudice."35' State Farm filed a motion to
set aside the settlement agreement claiming that the $75,000 was to be offset
by the $40,000 State Farm had already paid to Feldman; Feldman filed a
motion to enforce the settlement.352 The court of appeal concluded:
344. D.R. Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of W. Palm Beach, 819 So. 2d. 971, 973 (Fla
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
345. ld
346. ld at 972.
347. Id.
348. Interestingly, section 61.183(3) of the Florida Statutes, providing the confidentiality
privilege for dissolution of marriage matters, reads: "Each party to a mediation proceeding
has a privilege during and after the proceeding to refuse to disclose and to prevent another
from disclosing communications made during the proceeding, whether or not the contested
issues are successfully resolved." FLA. STAT. § 61.183(3) (2002). Perhaps mutual mistake
will be differently interpreted in dissolution of marriage cases.
349. D.R. Lakes, Inc., 819 So. 2d at 974.
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"[b]ecause State Farm claimed that there was a mutual mistake, the statutory
privilege protecting the confidentiality of all oral and written communica-
tions, other than the executed settlement agreement, should not apply. 353
Further, the court determined that the plain language of the agreement was
unambiguous and evidence adduced at hearing showed no offset of $40,000
was discussed during the mediation.354 Therefore, the court found that any
mistake was a unilateral mistake made by State Farm.35 5 "It is never the role
of the trial court to rewrite a contract to make it more reasonable for one of
the parties or to relieve a party from what turns out to be a bad bargain."35 6
D.R. Lakes and Feldman represent a new line of cases which may sig-
nificantly and negatively impact the future of mediation. Mere allegation of
mutual mistake should not be sufficient to eviscerate the mediation privilege.
When applicable, scrivener's error should be utilized to allow for limited
inquiry focusing exclusively on the alleged error.357 If both parties agreed
there had been mutual mistake, court determination would likely be unneces-
sary. When only one party claims the mutual mistake, difficulty of proof
exists, along with the potential for abuse.358 Parties to mediation share in-
formation with each other to allow for better understanding of their respec-
tive positions and goals. They do not share the information with the expecta-
tion that an allegation of mutual mistake will eradicate the privilege and al-
low third parties to subsequently gain access to communications meant to
remain between the mediating parties.
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of every-
thing that transpires during [mediation] sessions then counsel of
necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious,
tightlipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players
353. Id. at 276 (citing FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (2000); D.R. Lakes, Inc., 819 So. 2d at
971)).
354. Feldman, 824 So. 2d at 277.
355. Id.
356. Id. (quoting Barakat v. Broward County Hous. Auth., 771 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
357. In Haffa v. Haffa, discussed supra Section lI.D., the court directed the mediator to
testify, but limited inquiry to the alleged scrivener's error-the number of shares of stock to
be transferred from the husband to the wife. Case No. 93-3422-FL12 (Fla. I Ith Cir. Ct.
1994).
358. See generally Deason, supra note 17. A party may easily destroy the other parties'
confidentiality privilege by merely alleging mutual mistake if the court then admits evidence
and allows testimony that would otherwise be confidential. Bad faith allegations of mutual
mistake to get the court to hear such testimony will undermine parties' faith in the confidenti-
ality of the process.
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in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a
just resolution of a civil dispute.35 9
While it is not possible to guarantee that everything will be confidential,
it is reasonable and necessary for parties and their attorneys to "know" what
will and will not be considered confidential. Increased uncertainty as to the
application of the mediation privilege will likely have a chilling effect on
communications during the mediation process.
Twelve years prior to the decisions addressing mutual mistake, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal used nudum pactum (lack of consideration)
as a basis for setting aside a mediation agreement.3 16 In Leseke v. Nutaro, the
parties attended court-ordered mediation, and reached an agreement which
provided: "If Dr. Kramer indicates the Plaintiff has a herniation of C5-6 and
C6-7 the Defendants agree to re-evaluate the case. If Dr. Kramer indicates
no problems at C5-6 and C6-7 the Plaintiff will accept $40,000.00., '36' The
District Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in enforcing the settle-
ment based on Dr. Kramer's report, as the report did not indicate "no prob-
lems" at the specified cervical region.3 62 Further, it found the agreement to
be wholly lacking in consideration, for while Leseke was obligated to a term
of the agreement, Nutaro could take whatever evaluative action it chose.363
The facts of the Leseke decision do not support the finding of nudum pactum.
Having found that the doctor's report did not indicate what was required to
enforce the agreement, the court need not have reached the consideration
issue. Here, the parties were involved in litigation, had access to discovery,
were represented by counsel, and participated in a mediation session with a
neutral, trained mediator. The agreement may have been ill-advised for Le-
seke, but it was the deal she made with the advice of counsel. Nutaro agreed
to reevaluate under specific circumstances. This agreement constituted con-
sideration. If Leseke wanted more than a mere obligation to reevaluate, the
agreement needed to be written with greater specificity. Parties and attor-
neys drafting mediation agreements must remember to dot their "i's" and
cross their "t's.
' 364
359. Deason, supra note 17, at 36 (quoting Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Contain-
ers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979)).
360. Leseke v. Nutaro, 567 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
361. Id. at 949-50.
362. Id. at 950.
363. Id.
364. In City of Delray Beach v. Keiser, 699 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
Judge May wrote, "This appeal highlights the necessity of dotting 'i's' and crossing 't's' or, in
other words, 'details-details."' Id.
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VI. PROCEDURAL AND RELATED MATTERS
A. Access to the Courts
A trial court's referral of a case to mediation neither denies parties their
constitutional right to be heard in court, nor illegally delegates judicial au-
thority to a nonjudicial entity.365 In Kurtz v. Kurtz, a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari, the former husband challenged "a post-dissolution order which, by
application of local administrative order, defers judicial consideration of his
motion for contempt and a visitation schedule, pending family mediation."3
The court of appeal found the order withstood the husband's challenge for it
merely deferred ruling on his motion until after family mediation, and
"[s]urely [did] not rise to the level of a denial of a constitutional right con-
templated by article I, section 21 [of the Florida Constitution]. 367
Similarly, the trial court's order did not violate Article V of the Florida
Constitution as an illegal delegation of judicial responsibility, for the issues
remain for hearing before the trial court should the parties decide not to reach
agreement at mediation.3 68 "Mediation is not a binding court proceeding. If
it is unsuccessful, the parties return to the court for further proceedings. 369
In determining whether a matter is appropriate for mediation, courts will
look to the issues raised by the parties, not the title of the pleading. The for-
mer husband's issues involved visitation rights, identified by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure and two applicable administrative orders, as appro-
priate for referral to mediation.37
365. Kurtz v. Kurtz, 538 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
366. Id. at 893.
367. Id. at 894; see also FLA. CONST. Art. 1, § 21 (2002).
368. Kurtz, 538 So. 2d at 894.
369. Id. at 894-95.
370. Kurtz, 538 So. 2d at 894.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.740 expressly authorizes the trial court to refer parental re-
sponsibility issues to family mediators. Mediation under this rule is intended to expedite mat-
ters involving issues of parental responsibility. Rule 2.050 of the Florida Rules of Judicial
Administration authorizes local rules and administrative orders on matters of court concern. In
accordance with these rules, the chief judge of the Broward Circuit Court entered two adminis-
trative orders on family mediation which are involved here.
Id. at 894. Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure were adopted in 1995 after the Supreme
Court of Florida determined that separate procedural rules were appropriate for family court.
See generally In re Fla. Rules of Family Court Procedure, 607 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1992). Rule
12.740 of the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure now governs the referral of family law
matters to mediation. It is similar to its predecessor, rule 1.740 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, which was deleted in 1995. Id.
[Vol. 28:1:87
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Alternative dispute resolution processes should be crafted "without cre-
ating an unreasonable barrier to the traditional court system. 37' In Jackson
v. Jackson, parties in a dissolution of marriage action entered into a media-
tion/arbitration agreement.312 "That agreement provided that the controversy
between the parties was to be resolved exclusively by means of mediation or
arbitration and that the parties waived any right to litigate their claim." '373
The parties mediated and their matters were ostensibly concluded.3 74 None-
theless, eight months later the wife filed a petition for dissolution of mar-
riage. 375 The husband did not timely respond to the summons and complaint,
relying on the parties' agreement and the drafting attorneys' statements that
the agreement precluded them from pursuing civil action.376 Additionally,
the husband stated that the wife advised him she intended to withdraw the
lawsuit and proceed with arbitration.377 The court of appeal found excusable
neglect on the husband's part, reversed the trial court's denial of the motion
to set aside the default, and remanded to the trial court for proceedings con-
sistent with their opinion.378
Mediation parties must be given appropriate notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to court approval of mediation agreements. In Vance v.
Thomas, an incarcerated individual (Vance) participated in mediation by
phone.379 He denied agreeing to a settlement and no settlement papers were
executed. 38" Although there was no finding by the judge or representation by
Vance's counsel that Vance agreed to the settlement, the only hearing notice
sent to him regarded payment of fees and costs to his attorney. 381' The court
of appeal found the notice of hearing for attorney's fees inadequate notice for
the trial court to have conducted a hearing to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement.382
Similarly, an insurer was denied due process by not having an opportu-
nity to be heard prior to the court approving a mediation settlement agree-
371. Committee Notes 1994 Amendment, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.710. ("The Supreme Court
Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules encourages crafting a combination of dispute
resolution processes without creating an unreasonable barrier to the traditional court system.")
372. 542 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
373. id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 482.
376. Id.
377. Jackson, 542 So. 2d at 482.
378. Id. at 482-83.
379. Vance v. Thomas, 829 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 320.
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ment for the benefit of an insured." 3 A health insurance company sought to
intervene in a products liability lawsuit, which had been settled by mediation
before the court approved the settlement and dismissed the case.3" The dis-
trict court of appeal vacated the denial of the motion to intervene and the
order approving the settlement, finding: "Humana has demonstrated a right
to intervene and to at least be heard before distribution of the judgment or
settlement proceeds.385 Perhaps Humana's intervention will not change the
outcome, but at least Humana will have had the opportunity to be
heard .... 386 However, an insurance company which was present at media-
tion and had actual notice of the settlement was not entitled to summary
judgment in its favor based on insured's failure to provide written notice of
and obtain consent to the proposed settlement.387 Genuine issues of material
fact as to whether State Farm waived the settlement provisions and was
prejudiced by the failure to obtain its consent precluded summary judg-
ment.388
Appellate courts have been kind to petitioners who request the wrong
relief. "[I]f a party seeks an improper remedy 'the cause shall be treated as if
the proper remedy had been sought."' '3 9 In Croteau v. Operator Service
Company of South Florida, petitioners sought a writ of common law certio-
rari from the trial court's order denying their motion to enforce a mediated
agreement. 39' The court of appeal concluded that certiorari was not the
proper remedy.39' However, determining that the order denying the motion
to enforce the settlement agreement was a partial final judgment, the court
found it had jurisdiction to review the judgment.392
Parties seeking to appeal enforcement of mediation agreements must
provide the appellate court with either a trial transcript or proper substitute to
allow the court to evaluate allegations that the trial court erred.393 In Bartel
v. J & A Balboa Enterprises, Inc., Bartel appealed the trial court's order to
383. Humana Health Plans v. Lawton, 675 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
384. Id. at 1383.
385. Id. at 1385.
386. Id.
387. Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 734 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
388. Id.
389. Croteau v. Operator Serv. Co. of S. Fla., 721 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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enforce a mediation settlement agreement.394 The court of appeal elected to
treat the appeal as a writ of certiorari, and denied the writ.395 Bartel then
filed an appeal alleging that the attorney who represented her in the media-
tion that led to the settlement agreement was guilty of misconduct and mis-
representation.396 Since Bartel raised factual allegations, and failed to pro-
vide the court with a transcript or an appropriate substitute, she was unable to
establish error and her appeal necessarily failed.397
B. Use of and Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution
Parties must mediate when ordered by the court to do SO, 39 8 and may
also mediate on their own initiative prior to, during, or subsequent to litiga-
tion.39 When parties reach a mediation agreement, one may not later claim it
was void ab initio because the agreement was entered into while litigation
was pending in a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
terms in the agreement.4 °° In Patel v. Ashco Enterprises, Inc., the parties
entered into a mediation agreement while the case was pending in county
court. 40 ' The agreement provided that, "if Patel breached the agreement, the
case would be transferred to the circuit court and a judgment would be en-
tered against Patel ... ."" Following Patel's failure to make the first pay-
ment, the case was transferred to circuit court, and the court enforced the
agreement.4 3 The court of appeal found that the trial court properly enforced
the mediation agreement even though it was executed while litigation was
pending in county court and the county court's jurisdiction was subject to
challenge. 41 "While a settlement agreement may be the basis upon which a





398. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(a) (2003). A judge "may enter an order referring all or any part
of a contested civil matter to mediation .. " Id. A party may move to dispense with or defer
mediation. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(b) (c). For matters excluded from mediation, see FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.710(b).
399. Parties may file a written stipulation to mediate, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700(a), or one party
may request the court to refer the case to mediation. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(a) (2002). Par-
ties may also mediate without court orders.




404. Id. at 241.
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forceability of which is governed by the laws of contract."'"0 5 Parties seeking
to enforce mediation agreements may bring independent enforcement ac-
tions."'
The laws of contract also govern the parties' obligation to submit to ar-
bitration, and may include the condition precedent that the parties first medi-
ate.4°7 In Kemiron Atlantic, Inc. v. Aguakem International, Inc., the parties'
agreement read: "In the event that a dispute cannot be settled between the
parties, the matter shall be mediated within fifteen (15) days after receipt of
notice by either party that the other party requests the mediation of a dispute
pursuant to this paragraph."''48 The agreement also provided: "[I]n the event
that [a] dispute cannot be settled through mediation, the parties shall submit
the matter to arbitration within ten (10) days after receipt of notice by either
party."' ° Under the plain language of the agreement, a party had to request
mediation and provide notice of the request to the other party."' If the dis-
putes were not resolved in mediation, a party must then provide notice of
intent to pursue arbitration to trigger the arbitration clause.4 1'
Mediation may be required to move a case forward. It is not meant as a
dilatory tactic. In Paz v. Fidelity National Ins. Co., Paz appealed a circuit
court's decision entering summary judgment in favor of Fidelity.4 2 Paz had
submitted medical bills for injuries sustained in an automobile accident to
Fidelity, her insurer for personal injury protection benefits, demanding pay-
ment pursuant to statute within thirty days. 413 Following Fidelity's decision
to question the submitted charges and to demand arbitration or mediation,
Paz filed a bad faith action alleging her insurer breached its duty to act fairly
and honestly, and sought to delay or avoid payment by demanding mediation
and arbitration although neither was available. 4" The court of appeal found
the trial court erred as a matter of law, for Fidelity did not pay the damages
due within the required time frame. 415 "Additionally, summary judgment
was improper where review of the record shows that there are genuine issues
of [material] fact remaining as to the allegations that Fidelity routinely de-
405. Patel, 711 So. 2d at 240.
406. T.K.M. v. E.H., 844 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).




410. Id. at 1291
411. Id.
412. 712 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
413. Id. at 807-08.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 809.
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mands mediation and arbitration, as a means of delaying or avoiding pay-
ment.41
6
As some parties may seek to misuse mediation to delay legal obliga-
tions, some non-parties seek access to mediation proceedings to gain infor-
mation about governmental entities. In a case involving Lee County, the
City of Fort Myers, and the City of Cape Coral, a reporter "filed a motion for
limited intervention and to compel the mediation hearings to be open to the
public and the media."4"' The trial court granted the motion to intervene, but
denied the motion to open the mediation proceedings. 4 8 Further, the judge
amended the mediation order to allow the parties to send representatives to
mediation who did not have full authority to settle.4 '9 The court of appeal did
not decide the significant issue of whether the "Sunshine Law"42 applies to
mediation proceedings when public bodies are the parties.42' The court held
"that the narrow scope of the mediation proceedings in this case does not
give rise to a substantial delegation affecting the decision-making function of
any board, commission, agency, or authority sufficient to require that this
mediation proceeding be open to the public.4 22
C. Obligations of Judges, Attorneys, and Paralegals
Mediators should do the mediating, and judges the judging.423 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal offered this caveat in a case involving the former
baseball player Ted Williams.424 During a case management conference, the
judge offered to mediate the case, "provided ... all of the parties and their
attorneys agreed that they would not use the trial judge's attempt to mediate
the case as basis for disqualification., 425 During the mediation, the judge
said to the defendant, "there'll always be people like [you] around, but let's
face it, there's only one Ted Williams. 4 26 The defendant believed that the
416. Id.




420. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2002).
421. News-Press Publ'g Co., 570 So. 2d. at 1327.
422. Id.
423. Evans v. State, 603 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
424. Id. at 16.
425. Id.
426. Id. Additionally, when the defendant, Antonucci, presented his settlement figure, the
judge advised him to "get real." Idat 16 n.3.
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judge was prejudiced against him.42 7 Consequently, the defendant's attorney
filed a motion to disqualify the judge based on statements made by the judge
during mediation.428 Shortly thereafter, the judge adjudicated him guilty of
criminal contempt, finding the attorney lied when he agreed not to move to
disqualify the judge for mediating the case.4 29 Reversing the attorney's con-
viction of direct criminal contempt, the court of appeal directed that a judg-
ment of not guilty be entered.4 30 Additionally, the court advised:
If a judge decides to mediate a case with the consent of all con-
cerned parties, the judge should act only as a settlement judge for
another judge who will hear and try the matter in the event [the]
mediation fails, such as in the situation where a retired judge me-
diates a case but does not try the case.
Knowing a "mediator will not be deciding the case,.., the parties are
free to discuss ...the ramifications of settling a particular dispute as op-
posed to litigating it."' 32 "In contrast, the judge's role is to decide the con-
troversy fairly and impartially, consistent with the established rule of law. In
this regard, to paraphrase Socrates: Four things belong to a judge; to hear
courteously; to consider soberly; to decide impartially; and to answer
wisely. 43
3
Mediation does not displace judges' statutory obligation to rule on
claims. 434 In a dissolution of marriage action involving equitable distribution
of marital assets and debts, as well as attorney's fees, the judge dissolved the
marriage without ruling on the parties' claims.435 The court order, in relevant
part read: "The Husband/Petitioner and Wife/Respondent shall divide all of
their marital assets and liabilities equally. If the parties are unable to reach
agreement on their own as to a fair division then this matter shall be submit-
ted to mediation which shall be binding." 36 The court of appeal found that
the judge failed to carry out the statutory duties imposed on judges hearing
427. Evans, 603 So. 2d at 16 n.3.
428. Id. at 17.
429. Id. at 16.
430. Id. at 18. The court found the evidence did not support the judge's finding that appel-
lant had lied. Id. "The agreement not to seek recusal was limited to the trial judge acting as
mediator and not to the nature of any comments that the trial judge would make during the
mediation proceedings." Evans, 603 So. 2d at 17.
431. Id.,603 So. 2dat 17-18.
432. Id. at 17.
433. Id.





Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/5
FLORIDA MEDIATION CASE LAW
dissolution of marriage cases.4 37 The court was required to distribute both
marital and non-marital assets. 438 Furthermore, mediation allows the parties
self-determination. 43 If they choose not to reach agreement, there is no me-
diation agreement to be binding.4
The Code of Judicial Conduct limits the mediation functions judges
may ethically perform. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, charged
with rendering advisory opinions interpreting the Code of Judicial Conduct
as applied to specific circumstances facing judges, stated that a judge may
not privately mediate the dissolution of his friends' marriage. 44' "Unless
there is an expressed law or court rule authorizing the judge's service as a
private mediator, a judge may not ethically mediate the dissolution of his/her
friends' marriage. 442
Attorneys must also know their obligations to the court and the parties
regarding mediation. Foremost, an attorney should be aware that merely
filing a motion for mediation will not defeat case dismissal for lack of prose-
cution. "[A] motion for mediation conference, standing alone and without
any follow-up activity during the subsequent six-month period, is not record
activity implemented to advance the case forward to a conclusion on the
merits. ' 443 To avoid having a case dismissed for failure to prosecute, an at-
torney must proceed with the mediation following a notice, and if a motion
to dismiss hearing is set, must show good cause why the case should remain
pending.4 44
With virtually every civil case going to mediation prior to trial, media-
tors and attorneys are increasingly facing conflict of interest issues. Attorney
mediators and their law partners confront ethical directives of both profes-
sions when making difficult decisions regarding disqualification. A recent
case addresses "the standard to be applied in determining disqualification of
a law firm when a member of the firm previously acted as a mediator in the
pending dissolution proceedings."" 5 In Matluck v. Matuck, the former wife
filed a petition of certiorari to quash the trial court's order denying her mo-
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.230.
440. "Decision-Making. Decisions made during a mediation are to be made by the parties.
A mediator shall not make substantive decisions for any party. A mediator is responsible for
assisting the parties in reaching informed and voluntary decisions while protecting their right
of self-determination." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.310(a).
441. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-01.
442. Id.
443. Heinz v. Watson, 615 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
444. Id.
445. Matluck v. Matluck, 825 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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tion to disqualify her former husband's attorney.446 The parties had mediated
during post-dissolution proceedings, and the mediator had received highly
confidential information from the former wife and her counsel during the
mediation.447 The mediator, subsequently, formed a law firm with the attor-
ney who was representing the former husband on the same post-dissolution
448matters.
The former wife urged the court of appeal "to extend Rule 4-1.10(b) to
the law firm of a mediator who received confidential information during the
mediation process. 49 The court agreed: "Considering the broad scope of
information protected by Rule 4-1.10(b), the values inherent in preserving
the confidences of parties in mediation, and maintaining the integrity of the
mediation process itself, we can see no reason not to apply this rule to a me-
diator and the mediator's law firm.''45° Other courts and the Florida Mediator
Qualifications Panel are in accord. 451 "[I]t is inappropriate for the mediator to
represent either party in any dissolution proceeding or in any matter arising
out of the subject mediation." 452Additionally, a law firm will be subject to
disqualification from representing a client when following unsuccessful me-
diation, the firm hired the mediator.453
However, attorneys who seek to withdraw as counsel of record due to
conflicts of interest, will not necessarily gain court approval to do so. In
Billings, Cunningham, Morgan & Boatwright, P.A v. Isom, the law firm
moved to withdraw from representing a client who sought to set aside the
agreement reached during mediation, alleging mis-advice by the firm.454 The
client, Isom, asserted, "that a former associate of the law firm had advised
him to sign the settlement and release, but assured Isom the documents were
446. Id.
447. Id. at 1073.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 1073.
Rule 4-1.10(b) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct provides: When a lawyer be-
comes associated with a firm, [the] firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm of which the lawyer was associated,
had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and
about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is
material to the matter.
Matluck, 825 So. 2d at 1072.
450. Id. at 1073.
451. See id.
452. Id. (quoting Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 94-003). The Mediator
Qualifications Advisory Panel (MQAP) has been renamed the Mediator Ethics Advisory
Committee (MEAC).
453. Id. at 1073-74.
454. 701 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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not final and would not bar further settlement discussions." 4" The trial court
denied the firm's motion to withdraw, considering the client's allegation of
mis-advice, duration of representation, and the client's inability to obtain
new counsel.4 56 "[A] trial court has the authority to order continued repre-
sentation, even when potential ethical conflicts are presented. 457 Its decision
to deny a motion to withdraw will not be disturbed, absent a clear abuse of
discretion."458
A trial court also has the authority to award attorney's fees to enforce a
mediation agreement reached in a court-ordered mediation.459 "Rule 1.730(c)
[of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure] provides that a court may impose
sanctions, including attorney's fees, against a party who fails to perform un-
der a settlement agreement reached in court-ordered mediation."" Signifi-
cantly, even though a written mediation order is customary, Rule 1.730 does
not require a written order.46' "A court's oral order is valid and binds the
parties even though a written order has not been entered. 462 The trial court
has discretion to determine whether an attorney should be awarded fees un-
der this rule.463
Non-attorneys attending mediation sessions may not hold themselves
out as attorneys or engage in the unauthorized practice of law. 4 In Florida
Bar v. Neiman, the Florida Bar alleged that Neiman had "repeatedly engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law over a period of approximately seven
years.,4 65 The referee's detailed findings included that Neiman actively par-
ticipated in presenting clients' cases at mediation sessions. "The referee
further found that Neiman engaged in the unlicensed practice of law based





459. Lazy Flamingo, USA, Inc. v. Greenfield, 834 So. 2d 413, 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2003). The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision rejecting appellant's claim for
attorney's fees based on the original contract that gave rise to the underlying litigation and
section 57.105 of the 2001 Florida Statutes. Id. at 414. It reversed the trial court's decision
not to award fees based on rule 1.730(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and re-
manded the case to allow consideration of its ruling. Id. at 415.
460. Id. at 414.
461. Jd. at415.
462. Greenfield, 834 So. 2d at 415 (citing Knott v. Knott, 395 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
463. Id. (citing Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
464. See Florida Bar v. Neiman, 816 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2002).
465. Id. at 588.
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development or settlement of several of the cases."466 Having determined
that Neiman engaged in the unlicensed practice of law, the referee recom-
mended, and the court approved, that Neiman be enjoined from numerous
activities, including speaking on behalf of third parties at mediation even
with an attorney present, and appearing on behalf of third parties at media-
tion without the attorney present for whom he was employed.467
VII. CONCLUSION
Mediation has come of age and taken a place in Florida's legal system.
Our extensive body of case law over a relatively brief period of time high-
lights mediation's significant role in the resolution of disputes. Florida's
comprehensive mediation law necessarily includes ethical rules for media-
tors, rules of procedure, and statutory law. As the law further develops, me-
diators and lawyers will need to stay abreast of developments in the field.
This article is offered as a beginning in the discussion of mediation case law.
The Dispute Resolution Center in Tallahassee remains an excellent source of
continuing information and education. The Center holds annual conferences,
and publishes the Resolution Report to keep interested individuals apprized
of developments in the mediation field.46
Mediation's incorporation into the legal system should not signal its as-
similation. Mediation has more to offer than the mere resolution of disputes.
Mediating parties are in the unique position of making their own decisions
and structuring their own agreement with the assistance of a trained media-
tor. They rely on the confidentiality of the process to allow them to share the
information they need to understand each other and identify and evaluate
settlement options. They are also in the unique position of holding a privi-
lege to maintain the confidentiality of the process. The extent of the confi-
dentiality privileges should be clarified, and the courts should continue their
role in maintaining the shield of confidentiality. As we rightfully utilize me-
diation as a dispute resolution process, we must continue to recognize its
uniqueness and seek to preserve its process. After all, it has just come of
age. With a nourishing environment and some benign neglect, it may yet
flourish and increasingly serve not only the legal system, but society at large.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 594, 599.
468. Case and Comment, a regular feature in The Resolution Report written by Perry Itkin,
provides information about new significant mediation cases. The Resolution Report is the
newsletter published by the Dispute Resolution Center, a joint program of the Supreme Court
of Florida and the Florida State University College of Law. Perry Itkin, The Resolution re-
port, available at http://www.tfapm.org/Dreldrc-newsletter.shtml (last visited Oct. 1I, 2003).
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